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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays broadly themed around understanding 
consumer acceptance and farmer’s use of genetically engineered crops. Genetic engineering 
(GE) has developed crops that improve food safety, such as the Innate Potato which produces 
low levels of acrylamide, known to be cancer-causing in humans. GE has also contributed to 
improved food security through yield improving crops such as herbicide tolerant crops. The 
first two essays of this dissertation examine consumer acceptance of the GE Innate Potato 
and the third essay evaluates adoption of farming practices associated with consequences 
from the over adopting of herbicide tolerant crops. 
The first two essays use data from lab auctions to examine how injected information 
affects consumer’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for GE and conventional potato products. 
Consumers receiving information containing positive statements about genetic engineering to 
improve food safety and information containing the risks of acrylamide consumption had 
significantly higher WTP for GE potato products. The WTP was highest when these two 
types of information were paired. However, the injected information did not significantly 
impact a consumer’s WTP for conventional potato products, even after being informed of the 
cancer-causing potential of acrylamide. 
In the first essay I also find order of information is important when receiving both 
positive and negative information about GE products. Consumers had a significantly higher 
WTP when positive information follows negative information but not if the order is reversed. 
On the other hand, if neutral information precedes negative information consumers have a 
significantly higher WTP but not vice versa. 
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The third essay seeks to identify attributes of farmers that affect adoption of 
resistance management practices (RMPs) for coping with herbicide resistance in GE crop 
varieties. I find age, gender, and education significantly affect a farmer’s use of certain RMP 
groups. Younger farmers are more likely to use cultural intensive, mechanical intensive, and 
labor intensive RMPs. Male farmers and farmers with more years of formal education are 
more likely to use chemical and cultural RMPs. I also test for complementarity of RMP 
bundles and find farmers are more likely to use all RMPs simultaneously than individually.
  
CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 70 years, U.S agricultural output has more than doubled due to 
increases in the genetic potential of crops through plant breeding and developing new inputs 
and management strategies to protect yield potential. Pathogens, including insects, weeds, 
and fungi exist in the environment and their presence is a threat to high crop yields. 
Historically, farmers have used hand-weeding and mechanical weed controls, but commercial 
herbicides were developed starting in the 1950s. Commercial insecticides were developed 
later. Pesticide use in the U.S. increased more than tenfold between 1948 and 1980. This 
increase was mainly due to higher crop yields (larger revenue), and reduced input costs (less 
labor, fuel, and machinery used) for pest control. Specifically, herbicide adoption for major 
crops allowed farmers to switch from cultivation or other weed control methods to rely solely 
on herbicides (Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2014). However, pesticides pose a potential risk to 
human health from direct exposure to farm workers, from consumer exposure to pesticide 
residue, and from the environmental damage caused by pesticide infiltration of ground and 
surface water. In 1996, genetically engineered herbicide tolerant crops became commercially 
available to farmers, and this introduced a new method of weed control. 
 A string of scientific, technical, and legal advances was needed before herbicide 
tolerant (and insect resistant) crops became available to farmers. In 1953, James Watson and 
Francis Crick first correctly formulated the structure of the DNA molecule as a double helix 
and shortly thereafter showed how it replicated. In 1973, Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer 
discovered recombinant DNA, a method by which genetic material could be cut into small 
piece and inserted into another species. The insertion in other species was possible because 
the DNA from all organisms share the same chemical structure. In 1980, Stanford University 
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applied for a patent on the Cohen and Boyer gene splicing techniques, and the patent 
permitted licensing of the key tool used in future genetic engineering, i.e., human 
introduction or changes in DNA, RNA, or proteins in an organism to express a new trait or 
change the expression of an existing trait. The final link in the change of necessary events 
was the US Patent Office decision in ex parte Hibberd (1985) that patent protection extends 
to plants, including hybrids and other plants. The use of biotech methods facilitated proof of 
novelty (Huffman 2011).   
Genetically engineered (GE) crop traits can be classified into one of three 
generations, but I focus on the first two. First generation GE crops feature enhanced input 
traits, such as herbicide tolerant (HT) or insect resistant (IR) varieties. Some problems 
associated with this new GE technology were the rise of pesticide resistance with the intense 
use of these new biological controls. The second-generation features output-enhancing traits 
such as nutrient-enhancement and enhanced food safety as in the case of low-acrylamide 
forming crops. Lastly, the third-generation of GE crops include traits to allow the production 
of plant-made pharmaceuticals and products beyond traditional foods. 
 In 1994 the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspective Service (APHIS) approved 
the first second-generation GE crop, the FlavrSavr Tomato. This tomato was modified to 
delay premature fruit softening leading to a longer shelf life. However, since 1994 there have 
been very few second-generation GE crops developed and approved by USDA APHIS with 
the most recent being the Arctic Apple and Innate Potato. The Arctic Apple is engineered to 
keep from browning to reduce food waste due to superficial bruising and browning. The 
Innate Potato is engineered to be low-bruising and low-blackening (reduces food waste in  
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processing) and reduced potential for forming high concentrations of a probable carcinogen, 
acrylamide. 
 The objective of this dissertation is (1) to examine how subject’s information and 
information injected into lab experiments affect how well-informed consumers are about 
biotechnology and acrylamide exposure and how much they are willing-to-pay for new low 
acrylamide GE potato products, and (2) identify attributes of farmers and farms that affect 
adoption of resistance management practices (RMPs) for coping with herbicide resistance in 
GE crop varieties. U.S. consumer acceptance of genetically engineered products has not been 
widespread, which is manifested in preferences for mandatory labels. Key factors influencing 
consumers’ attitudes of GE crops are the perception of risk and benefits and knowledge about 
the enhanced traits (Lucht, 2015).  
Weeds (and insects) are living organisms that inherently want to survive and have the 
capacity to change biologically becoming resistant to new pest controls. The widely used HT 
Roundup Ready crops are modified such that crops will have limited damage from direct 
exposure to Roundup. Roundup, also known by its active ingredient, glyphosate, was 
released in 1974. It is a broad-spectrum herbicide reported to have very low toxicity to 
mammals, birds, and fish. However, when first released, glyphosate could only be used 
before crop seeding since it is a non-selective herbicide and will damage crops in addition to 
the targeted weeds. The introduction of Roundup Ready crops allows glyphosate to be used 
on crops pre- and post-emergence (before, during, and after crops are planted). As a result, 
glyphosate use has increased dramatically since 1996 while the use of all other herbicides 
declined (Livingston et al., 2015). 
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Glyphosate is becoming less effective at controlling weeds and The International 
Survey of Herbicide Resistant Weeds identified 17 glyphosate-resistant weed species 
currently infesting farms in the United States (Heap, 2018). Glyphosate-resistant weeds are 
not dying with glyphosate applications and are decreasing crop yields and increasing weed 
control costs. Farmers are having to find alternative methods of weed control to delay the 
onset and spread of resistant weeds (known as resistance management practices).  
 
References 
Fernandez-Cornejo, Jorge, Richard Nehring, Craig Osteen, Seth Wechsler, Andrew Martin,  
and Alex Vialou. Pesticide Use in U.S. Agriculture: 21 Selected Crops, 1960-2008, 
EIB-124,  
 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, May 2014. 
 
Heap, I.  The International Survey of Herbicide Resistant Weeds. Online. Internet. Saturday,  
June 2, 2018. Available www.weedscience.org 
 
Huffman, W.E. “Contributions of Public and Private R&D to Biotechnology Innovation.” In 
Genetically Modified Food and Global Welfare, C. Carter, G. Moschini and I. 
Sheldon, Eds.,  
 
Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited 2011, pp. 115-148.  
 
Livingston, Michael, Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo, Jesse Unger, Craig Osteen, David  
 
Schimmelpfennig, Tim Park, and Dayton Lambert. The Economics of Glyphosate Resistance  
Management in Corn and Soybean Production, ERR-184, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Economic Research Service, April 2015. 
 
Lucht, Jan M. “Public Acceptance of Plant Biotechnology and GM Crops.” Ed. Thomas  
Hohn. Viruses 7.8 (2015): 4254–4281. PMC. Web. 3 June 2018. 
 
National Research Council (NRC). 2010. The Impact of Genetically Engineered Crops on  
Farm Sustainability in the United States. National Academies Press, Washington, 
DC. 
 
5 
 
CHAPTER 2.    HOW INFORMED ARE CONSUMERS ABOUT NEW FOOD 
TECHNOLOGY? A ROLE FOR NEW INFORMATION 
Introduction 
Potatoes have remained a leading vegetable crop in the United States. In 2017, the 
U.S. produced 44 billion pounds of potatoes.  Sixty-four percent of the production are for 
processed potatoes, corresponding to 82 pounds of processed potatoes per capita. However, 
the per capita availability of processed potatoes has been gradually declining since 1996 
(Parr et al., 2018). 
 In 2002, acrylamide was discovered in potatoes when cooked at temperatures 
exceeding 250 degrees Fahrenheit (Tareke et al., 2002). This occurs when potatoes are fried, 
baked, or roasted to make processed potato products, such as French fries, potato chips, and 
hash browns. The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) designates 
acrylamide as a “probable human carcinogen” (Lineback et al., 2012). Under California’s 
proposition 65, major restaurant chains that serve fried potato products must post a warning 
that the products contain acrylamide, a chemical known to the state of California to cause 
cancer (OAG, 2008). Acrylamide is a by-product of the Maillard reaction, which also 
produces the dark-colored pigments or browning of French fries, potato chips, and hash 
browns. Acrylamide occurs naturally when asparagine (an amino acid) and reducing sugars 
are heated to high temperatures (250°F). Generally, the acrylamide content rises as the 
pigments become darker (Bethke and Bussan, 2013). 
 Due to the cancer risk of acrylamide, the U.S. potato industry has sought to decrease 
or even eliminate acrylamide from potato products sold in California (California Department 
of Justice, 2008). Conventional breeding of potatoes and alternative potato storage 
procedures have been unsuccessful in significantly reducing acrylamide formation during 
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high-temperature cooking of potatoes, but methods using biotechnology have seen success. 
Scientists have used gene editing technology to create low-acrylamide potatoes. The new 
potatoes have significantly reduced acrylamide formation during processing and low-
bruising, while in storage, and low-blackening properties, when a fresh potato is cut by a 
knife (Bethke and Bussan, 2013). 
 Since acrylamide is not well known among U.S. consumers and low-acrylamide 
potatoes are a new product, this study evaluates consumers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for 
these biotech potatoes. Further, we examine the effects of injecting pre-packaged information 
into consumers’ decision making reflected in their WTP for conventional and low-
acrylamide biotech potatoes. We test how the information received affects consumers’ self-
reported knowledge on biotechnology and acrylamide. 
To elicit a consumer’s true willingness-to-pay for conventional potatoes and potatoes 
made using biotechnology, we used a random n-th price auction. This auction mechanism 
was first developed by Shogren and others in 2001. They argue the mechanism induces 
sincere bidding by subjects especially by off-margin bidders. Here, off-margin bidders value 
the product much lower than the market-clearing price. In other price auctions, such as a 
second-price auction, these off-margin bidders do not bid their true value because they do not 
see a chance of winning the auction. However, with the n-th price auction, each participant 
has a positive probability of submitting the winning bid, which in turn elicits their true WTP 
for the product (Shogren et al, 2001). 
 Rousu and others (2007) developed a method for valuing information within the n-th 
price auction framework. Two n-th price auctions are completed.  First subjects bid on the 
product before receiving any information. After the first auction, they are given third-party 
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information followed by a second auction. The pre- and post-information bids are differenced 
to determine the value of information provided to the subjects. 
 In their application, Rousu and others (2007) evaluated the effect of pro-biotech and 
anti-biotech information on consumers’ WTP for vegetable oil, tortilla chips, and potatoes, 
which might be genetically modified (made using biotechnology). The authors found that 
subjects receiving anti-biotech information had a higher WTP for conventional products 
compared to genetically modified products. Similarly, Huffman et al. (2007) show that 
subject-reported prior beliefs about genetic modification and new information affect bidding 
behavior for genetically modified products. 
 Using a similar methodology, Depositario and others (2009) found consumers have 
the highest WTP for genetically modified rice when they were provided positive GM 
information, followed by no information, negative GM information, or both positive and 
negative GM information. However, the difference between the effects of positive 
information and no information is very small. When testing the effect of receiving both 
positive and negative information, Depositario et al. (2009) did not consider an ordering 
effect. In an application to evaluate the demand for fish, Marette et al. (2008) found the order 
in which subjects receive information significantly affects their preferences. More 
participants switched to the healthier fish if they received information containing the benefits 
of the healthier fish followed by information containing the risks of the other option.  
 Using segments of the data for this study, McFadden and Huffman (2017a) found 
subjects exposed to negative information on technology significantly reduced WTP for 
potato products. Conversely, Lacy and Huffman (2016) find subjects exposed to positive 
information about the technology and risks associated with exposure to acrylamide, increases 
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consumers’ WTP for biotech potatoes. Additionally, information on the risks associated with 
acrylamide and information on the benefits of reducing acrylamide exposure increase 
consumers’ WTP for biotech potatoes (McFadden & Huffman, 2017a; McFadden & 
Huffman, 2017b).  
 In this paper, we analyze the effect of varying information and order of information 
on consumer’s willingness-to-pay for conventional and biotech potato products. This study 
shows new information significantly affects a consumer’s WTP for biotech potato products 
and the impact depends on the order of information received. The probability of a consumer 
WTP more for biotech potatoes after receiving information is greatest when consumers 
receive both informative/neutral information on acrylamide and positive information on 
genetic engineering jointly. But the effect on WTP of these two statements separately paired 
with negative information varies and is dependent on information order.  
Additionally, we evaluate how information affects self-reported knowledge of biotechnology 
and acrylamide. Individual differences affect a subject’s perceived knowledge gain about 
biotechnology, but the information the consumer receives has no significant effect on 
biotechnology knowledge.  On the other hand, receiving any of the information statement 
combinations included in this study leaves consumers significantly more informed about 
acrylamide. 
Experimental Design 
The experiments were conducted in three locations, each with their own recruiting 
agency. The Survey and Behavioral Research Services (SBRS) at Iowa State University 
developed the recruitment protocol. Target subjects were 18 to 65 years of age, could follow 
directions, write in English, and were willing to come to a common location at a specified 
time. Potential participants were told that an Iowa State University project was recruiting 
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subjects to participate in sessions on how households select food and household products. 
Further, the sessions were described as a food preference experiment designed like an auction 
that would take 75 minutes for which participants would receive $65. 
 Recruitment for Des Moines, Iowa was conducted by SBRS who used a set of 
randomly selected landline telephone numbers. The recruitment for Los Angeles, California 
and Boston, Massachusetts was conducted in a different manner than Des Moines.  For both 
locations we collaborated with market research companies. Focus and Testing, located in Los 
Angeles, has a subject pool of 100,000 adults. The company randomly selected participants 
from their pool to participate in our sessions. Similarly, Answer Quest, located in Boston, 
randomly selected participants from their list of 60,000 potential subjects. The subject pools 
for both locations are comprised of individuals who have previously participated in a market 
research projects with the company, but not experimental auctions. 
 At each location, the lab was laid out classroom-style with a display table in the front 
of the room. The products were placed on the table before subjects were admitted to the lab 
and covered with plastic totes until the subjects were placing bids on those specific products. 
Experimental potato products were packaged in transparent plastic bags with plainly 
designed food labels. This was to ensure no trademark, brand, or other information was on 
the bags that could further influence bid prices. 
 Subjects could choose among four starting times at each location with two concurrent 
sessions taking place at each time. Upon arrival at the lab site and completing a consent form, 
subjects were alternately assigned to rooms A and B. Each session was conducted by a 
session monitor (who remained the same for each location) and one assistant and consisted of 
the same ten steps (see Figure 2.1). The first three experiments (9:00AM, 11:30AM, and 
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1:30AM) had three different potato products - a 5 lb. bag of fresh whole potatoes, 12 oz. bag 
of classic cut potato chips, and 2 lb. bag of frozen French fries. The subjects participating in 
these experiments received a scientific perspective, industry perspective, environmental 
perspective, or a combination of two perspectives. While the day’s fourth experiment 
(3:30PM) consisted of a 5lb. bag of fresh whole potatoes and 12 oz. bag of fresh cut diced 
potatoes labeled as fresh cut potato dices. The subjects in the last experimental sessions 
received a company perspective, environmental perspective, or both perspectives. 
In Step 1, the subjects were greeted by a receptionist and asked to read and sign an 
informed consent form.  Once the form was completed, the subjects were assigned an ID 
number, handed a packet of project materials, and told to enter the lab and take a seat.1 While 
waiting for the experiment to start, subjects were asked to complete a pre-auction 
questionnaire that collected socio-economic information and information about use of food 
labels while shopping for food products. In addition, subjects were asked to state their 
knowledge about biotech foods, non-biotech foods, and acrylamide before the experiments.2 
This covers the type of pre-auction information collected.  To relieve subjects’ concerns 
about a credit constraint in the experiment, each subject was, at this point, paid $65 for 
participating in the experiments and asked to sign a receipt. The auction was not expected to 
exhaust the $65 so there is no expectation that the budget constraint would bind at $65. 
  In Step 2 subjects were informed that they would be participating in an auction, and 
there would be two practice rounds of bidding to learn the auction mechanism.  Subjects 
                                                 
1 Individuals who arrived together, e.g., a husband and wife, or mother and daughter, etc., were assigned to 
different sessions. 
2 By asking about knowledge in more than one area, we believe that any one of these questions is unlikely to 
bias our experimental results. Also, those subjects that indicate that biotechnology and GMOs are different are 
anticipated to be more informed about this area of science than others. 
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were told it was always in their best interest to bid their true preferences.  Subjects were 
asked to direct all questions to the monitor and to refrain from communicating with other 
subjects.  
Next, the session monitor read through an explanation of the random n-th price 
auction and addressed any questions raised by the subjects. The auction was explained in 5 
easy steps: 1) subjects would be asked to come to the front of the room, single file, and 
examine product(s) on a display table, 2) subjects were to return to their seat and write down, 
on a bid sheet attached in their packet, the bid for the product(s), 3) bid sheets were collected 
by the session monitor and assistant, bid prices were ranked from highest to lowest for each 
product, and the binding round (when more than one round of bidding occurs) randomly 
selected, 4) the random price would be randomly selected, and 5) the monitor will notify 
winners for each product using ID numbers. The session monitors informed subjects it was in 
their best interest to bid how much they truly valued each product. 
In Step 3, to get the subjects familiar with the auction mechanism, they were trained 
to bid on a single product, a generic ceramic coffee mug.  Subjects were asked to come to the 
front of the room, one-by-one, to view the product and then return to their seats.3 They were 
told to fill out a bid sheet attached to their packet, detach it and place it face down on the 
table in front of them. The monitor and assistant collected the bid sheets and recorded the 
bids and ID number for each bidder in an excel spreadsheet. Bids were ranked sequentially 
from highest to lowest.  The rank of the winning bid was determined by randomly drawing a 
number from a uniform distribution over 2 to k, where k is the number of subjects in a 
session. The random number, n, determined the rank of the random price. For example, if 
                                                 
3 We used non-food items in our practice rounds so as to reduce impacts on later bids on experimental products 
(Nunes and Boatwright 2004).  
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𝑘 = 16 and the random n is 4, the 3 subjects that bid strictly higher than the random price 
were the winners, and they paid the random price (4th highest price). These ranked bids with 
ID numbers and random n-th price were displayed on a screen in front of the room.    
In Step 4, subjects were asked to complete a short, four question quiz on the auction 
format, and the session monitor reviewed the answers and addressed questions. After 
questions from this round were resolved, the monitor moved on to Step 5, the second practice 
round, to familiarize the subjects with bidding on three (or two) products at a time. The 
products were: a notepad, binder, and package of pens for the first three experimental times 
at each location and a notepad and package of pens for the last experiment time.    
In Step 6, subjects placed bids on real experimental products: two rounds of bidding 
on a 5 lb. bag of Russet Potatoes, 12 oz. bag of classic cut potato chips, and 2 lb. bag of 
frozen French fries for the first three experiment times and a 5 lb. bag of Russet Potatoes and 
12 oz. bag of fresh cut potato dices for the last sessions.  To ease budget constraint issues, 
subjects were told that winners of these auctions would purchase at most one unit of each of 
the commodities.  In round 1, the products carried either a conventional or biotech food label 
(see Figure 2.2).4 The order in which subjects saw either conventional or biotech products 
was randomized to minimize order effects in bidding. Subjects were asked to come to the 
front of the room, view the products, return to their seats, and place their bids on bid sheets. 
Once completed, the bid sheets were collected by the monitor and assistant.  In round 2, the 
participants were asked to bid on the same type of products as round 1 but this time the 
products were conventional if they were biotech in round one and vice versa. 
 
                                                 
4 A private food company supplied the project with experimental products for the lab displaces that were 
authentic and matched the contents stated on the food labels. 
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In Step 7, subjects were asked to read the information statement(s) included in their 
packet. Copies of the information packets are presented in Figures 2.3 – 2.6. Subjects were 
given about 10 minutes to read the information. Each subject was randomly assigned to an 
information treatment group, which determined the particular information statement they 
received.  The information treatments for the first three experimental starting times consisted 
of three different perspectives: an (positive) industry perspective on low acrylamide potatoes 
using biotechnology, a (informative) scientific perspective on acrylamide exposure, and an 
(negative) environmental group perspective on biotechnology. Subjects received one of these 
information statements or a combination of two with order randomized, resulting in 9 
information treatment groups. While the information treatments for the last experiment 
sessions consisted of two different perspectives: a (positive) company perspective on using 
biotechnology to reduce bruising of potatoes in storage and processing and acrylamide levels 
in processed potato products and a (negative) environmental group perspective on 
biotechnology5. An additional two information-treatment groups were provided both 
information statements (company perspective followed by environmental perspective or 
environmental perspective followed by company perspective).6 
After Step 7, the subjects moved on to Step 8 where they placed rounds 3 and 4 bids 
on experimental products.  As with Step 6, the only difference between rounds 3 and 4 was 
whether the subjects were randomly placed in a group that saw food labels showing 
conventional products or biotechnology products first or second. 
  
                                                 
5 This environmental perspective is the same for all time sessions. 
6 Some environmental groups, e.g., Greenpeace and Friends-of-the-Earth, have a strong negative perspective on 
GMOs and biotechnology in general, while others have a more moderated view (Greenpeace 2014; Friends-of-
the-Earth 2014). 
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After all bids from Step 8 were collected by the monitor and assistant, subjects moved 
on to Step 9 where they were asked to complete a short post-auction questionnaire.  There 
were questions about household consumption patterns for potatoes and potato products, about 
how well the subject understood the information treatment that they received and read and re-
examined how well the subject was informed about biotechnology and acrylamide after 
participating in the auction and reading the information treatment included in their packet.  
While the participants were completing the questionnaire, the monitor and assistant were 
inputting the bids for experimental products into a computer spreadsheet.  
In Step 10, subjects were informed that the biotechnology products were not currently 
available in grocery stores and that winners would receive conventional potato products 
obtained from a local grocery store.  The monitor then randomly chose the binding round 
from the two rounds of bidding on the conventional products, displayed the ranked bids for 
this round for both products, and then chose the random price or random n.7 Winners were 
then identified by ID number.  Monitors and assistants then collected packets from the 
subjects in the session, the winners were escorted to the stock room to purchase the products, 
and the subjects who did not win were told that they were dismissed and free to leave. 
Data 
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for socioeconomic characteristics, location, 
and information statements and Table 2.2 displays mean bid differences by information. Of 
the 403 participants, 139 are from Los Angeles, 128 are from Boston, and 136 are from Des 
Moines. The average age of the participants is 43 years old with 14.4 years of education, 
equivalent to a two-year degree. Thirty-eight percent are male, which is similar to the 
                                                 
7 For winners of fresh-cut potato dices, they received a 12 oz package of a close substitute, Simply PotatoesTM, a 
product available in the dairy case of major grocery stores and super markets.    
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composition of grocery store shoppers, and the average household income is $75,177.06. 
When reporting their knowledge about biotechnology and acrylamide, 41% were at least 
somewhat informed about biotechnology while only 10% were at least somewhat informed 
about acrylamide. Additionally, 88% of the participants reported reading food labels when 
they purchase a new product for the first time, and 45% view GM and biotechnology as 
different.  
 Of the 403 participants, 235 received just one information statement and 168 received 
two information statements. On average, participants bid less post-information relative to 
pre-information as can be seen with the mean bid differences greater than zero, in Table 2.2, 
for all potato products. However, mean bid differences vary by information statements 
received. 
Regression Model 
First, we consider a model of willingness-to-pay for the gth commodity, vth variety, by the ith 
subject receiving the jth information treatment, 𝑊𝑖𝑗
𝑔𝑣
. The commodities are a 5 lb. bag of fresh 
whole potatoes, 12 oz. bag of classic cut potato chips, 2 lb. bag of frozen French fries, and 12 
oz. bag of fresh cut potato dices. For all goods, the varieties are conventional and 
biotechnology products.  For fresh cut potato dices, the varieties are slightly different; they 
are conventional (with sodium bisulfite) and low acrylamide and sulfite free (achieved using 
potatoes grown with seed improved by biotechnology).8 Each subject bids on a set of 
products before receiving a packaged information treatment, and then again after the 
injection of the informative treatment:  (1) industry perspective, (2) scientific perspective, 
and (3) an environmental group perspective on biotechnology (anti-biotech), or (4) a 
                                                 
8 Sodium bisulfite is a preservative used in conventional dices to limit discoloration (turning black) of the 
product when exposed to the air. 
16 
 
combination of two of the information statements.  Additionally, there was a set of 
participants that received (5) an environmental group perspective, (6) a (positive biotech) 
company perspective on using biotechnology to lower bruising and acrylamide potential, or 
(7) a combination of the two.   
We write WTP for the gth commodity, vth variety for the ith subject receiving the j-
type of information as: 
𝑊𝑖𝑗
𝑔𝑣 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑗
𝑔𝑣 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑔𝑣𝐼𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑔𝑣
 (2.1) 
where 𝑋𝑖 is a set of dummy variables to account for pre-experimental knowledge, 𝐼𝑖𝑗 is an 
indicator for information treatment, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑔𝑣
 represents other individually small effects on 
𝑊𝑖𝑗
𝑔𝑣
 and it has a zero mean.  The baseline model is achieved when the ith individual engages 
in the first round of bidding (before information treatment) is:  
𝑊𝑖0
𝑔𝑣 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽0
𝑔𝑣 + 𝜀𝑖0
𝑔𝑣
 (2.2) 
In our experiments, each of the i subjects bids first on commodity g of variety v before 
information treatment and then a second time after receiving an information treatment. 
Following earlier studies, e.g., Hoffman et al. (1992) and Rousu et al. (2007), we convert the 
WTP model into one of WTP differences—WTP before information minus WTP after 
information treatment: 
𝑊𝑖0
𝑔𝑣 − 𝑊𝑖1
𝑔𝑣 = 𝑋𝑖(𝛽0
𝑔𝑣 − 𝛽1
𝑔𝑣) − 𝜏𝑖
𝑔𝑣𝐼𝑖1 + 𝜀𝑖0
𝑔𝑣 − 𝜀𝑖1
𝑔𝑣
 (2.3) 
 
𝑊𝑖0
𝑔𝑣 − 𝑊𝑖1
𝑔𝑣 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽
𝑔𝑣 − 𝜏𝑖
𝑔𝑣𝐼𝑖1 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑔𝑣
 (2.4) 
  
where 𝛽𝑔𝑣 = (𝛽0
𝑔𝑣 − 𝛽1
𝑔𝑣) and 𝜀𝑖
𝑔𝑣 = (𝜀𝑖0
𝑔𝑣 − 𝜀𝑖1
𝑔𝑣) and the last disturbance terms has a zero 
mean.  Further,  
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𝑊𝑖0
𝑔𝑣 − 𝑊𝑖1
𝑔𝑣 = 𝑌𝑖𝛼
𝑔𝑣 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑔𝑣
 (2.5) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖 includes 𝑋𝑖 and 𝐼𝑖1 and 𝛼
𝑔𝑣 includes 𝛽𝑔𝑣 and 𝜏𝑖
𝑔𝑣
. The advantages to this 
specification include that the new dependent variable in equation (2.5) can be positive, zero, 
or negative, and hence, the disturbance of the random disturbance term 𝜀𝑖
𝑔𝑣
 is more likely to 
be normally distributed than for 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑔𝑣
. Taking differences also removes any common 
individual fixed or random effects, including individual idiosyncrasies, which would 
otherwise be a possible source of biases in the estimated coefficients of the WTP equation 
(Greene 2003).  
 We are interested in determining if the information statements increase or decrease 
the probability of paying more for biotech potato products and conventional potato products.  
Therefore, the probability that equation (2.3) is less than zero must be estimated. 
Specifically, 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑊𝑖0
𝑔𝑣 − 𝑊𝑖1
𝑔𝑣 < 0) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋𝑖(𝛽0
𝑔𝑣 − 𝛽1
𝑔𝑣) − 𝜏1
𝑔𝑣𝐼𝑖1 + 𝜀𝑖0
𝑔𝑣 − 𝜀𝑖1
𝑔𝑣 < 0) 
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜀𝑖0
𝑔𝑣 − 𝜀𝑖1
𝑔𝑣 < 𝑌𝑖𝛼
𝑔𝑣) 
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜀𝑖
𝑔𝑣 < 𝑌𝑖𝛼
𝑔𝑣) 
= 𝐹(𝑌𝑖𝛼
𝑔𝑣) 
(2.6) 
 
where 𝜀𝑖
𝑔𝑣 = 𝜀𝑖0
𝑔𝑣 − 𝜀𝑖1
𝑔𝑣  and 𝐹(⋅) is a cumulative distribution function evaluated at 𝑌𝑖𝛼
𝑔𝑣. 
Therefore, we can estimate equation (2.6) using a probit model. 
Results 
Results from fitting equation (2.6) for biotech and conventional potatoes are reported in 
Table 2.3.  We find the information statements had very little effect on changing a 
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consumer’s WTP for conventional potatoes but did have significant effects on the WTP for 
biotech potatoes. 
Subjects who reported believing, pre-experiment, that biotechnology and genetically 
modified products were different had a significantly higher WTP post-information treatment 
for conventional potatoes. This effect was negative but insignificant for biotech potatoes. On 
the other hand, subjects who reported being informed about biotechnology before the 
experiment had a significantly higher WTP post-information treatment for biotech potatoes. 
But this effect was positive and insignificant for conventional potatoes. 
Compared to receiving the environmental perspective, subjects who received the 
industry perspective, scientific perspective, or company perspective had a higher WTP post-
information for biotech potatoes. Further, the results show the order subjects receive 
information, when presented with more than one perspective, was significant. A subject who 
received both industry and scientific perspectives had a significantly higher WTP post-
information relative to pre-information for biotech potatoes regardless of information order.  
Additionally, pairing industry and scientific perspectives results in a greater probability of a 
higher WTP post-information compared to receiving these statements individually. The 
positive biotech information and informative acrylamide information complement each other 
and strengthen the effect on WTP for biotech potatoes. However, for conventional potatoes, 
subjects who read the industry perspective first had a significantly lower WTP post-
information while subjects who read the industry perspective after the scientific perspective 
had a higher WTP post-information, but this effect was insignificant. 
When bidding on biotech potatoes, if the subject received the environmental 
perspective before the industry perspective he/she had a significantly higher WTP post-
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information. But receiving the information in the opposite order did not have a significant 
effect on WTP. Similarly, reading the scientific perspective first followed by the 
environmental perspective resulted in a significantly higher WTP for biotech potatoes post-
information but the opposite information order did not significantly affect WTP. On average, 
the positive biotech information outweighed negative biotech information if it followed the 
negative information instead of preceding it. But, informative (neutral) information 
outweighed negative biotech information only if it preceded the negative information. 
For potato chips, French fries, and potato dices we found the information statements 
had no significant impact on the willingness to pay for the conventional products. Compared 
to the environmental perspective, a subject who received the industry or scientific 
perspective had a significantly higher WTP for biotech French fries and biotech potato chips. 
Also, compared to the environmental perspective, subjects had a significant higher WTP for 
biotech potato dices after receiving the company perspective. Regardless of order, when a 
subject read both the industry and scientific perspective their WTP was significant higher 
post-information for both biotech French fries and potato chips. This further supports the 
complementarity of positive biotech information and informative acrylamide information. 
However, pairing negative biotech information with either positive biotech information or 
informative acrylamide information does not affect WTP for biotech processed potato 
products. 
Next, we examine how a subject’s self-reported pre-experiment knowledge of 
biotechnology and acrylamide is affected by the information statements received. As can be 
seen in Tables 2.7 and 2.8, the information statements did not have a significant impact on 
self-reported knowledge of biotechnology but had significant impacts on self-reported 
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knowledge of acrylamide.  Since subjects entered the experiment with little to no knowledge 
of acrylamide, it is not surprising that information distributed in the experiment significantly 
increased their perceived knowledge.  
Conversely, our demographic variables significantly affected a subject’s self-reported 
post-experiment knowledge of biotechnology. When a male reported being uniformed, pre-
experiment, he was significantly less likely to report being informed about biotechnology 
after the auction. Younger subjects and those with more years of education were less likely to 
report being more informed about biotechnology after the experiment if they previously 
reported being uninformed. Also, younger subjects and those who report reading food labels 
were significantly less likely to report becoming more informed about biotechnology after 
the experiment. Higher income subjects were significantly more likely to report being 
informed about biotechnology after the experiment when previously reported being 
uninformed. After excluding the demographic variables from our regression, we find little 
changes in the effect of the information statements. 
We find all information statement combinations significantly increased a subject’s 
self-reported knowledge of acrylamide. When a subject reported, pre-experiment, being 
uninformed about acrylamide, he/she was significantly more likely to report being informed 
about acrylamide after the experiment. Additionally, subjects were significantly more likely 
to report being more informed about acrylamide after the experiment with all information 
statement combinations. However, LA subjects were significantly less likely to be affected 
by acrylamide information provided during the experiment compared to Des Moines 
subjects. 
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Conclusion 
This paper has shown new information affects consumer’s willingness to pay for new 
biotech potatoes and self-reported knowledge of acrylamide. However, consumer’s WTP for 
conventional potato products remain unaffected. Consumers are willing to pay more for 
products potentially viewed as safer or reduced cancer risk, but not willing to pay less for 
products which could potentially contain a cancer-causing agent. Many subjects entered our 
experiment with very little knowledge about this cancer-causing agent, acrylamide, but 
reported being more informed about acrylamide after reading injected information. 
Additionally, we show order of information is important when consumers receive 
both positive and negative information. If positive information follows negative information 
consumers’ WTP is significantly higher for biotech potatoes after receiving the information, 
but their WTP is not significantly different if positive information precedes negative 
information. If informative/neutral information precedes negative information, consumers 
have a significantly higher WTP post-information, which is not significantly different if the 
order is reversed. On the other hand, if consumers receive both positive and informative 
information the WTP for biotech potatoes is significantly higher post-information regardless 
of the order. And the effect is greater with both information statements compared to 
receiving the information separately. 
To increase demand for low-acrylamide potato products, retailers should provide 
consumers with information on the benefits of genetic engineering to reduce acrylamide and 
potential cancer-causing attributes of acrylamide. From our results, providing this 
information will increase the demand for biotech potatoes while not affecting the demand for 
conventional potatoes. The information will also increase awareness of the potential dangers 
of acrylamide consumption, which is relatively unknown by the public. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 2.1 Steps in the Experiment 
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Figure 2.2 Auction Labels 
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Table 2.1 Sample Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
  Demographics 
Income ($) 75,177.06 46,396.33 
Male 0.382 0.487 
Age 42.93 13.82 
Education (years) 14.39 2.13 
Reads Food Labels (=1) 0.881 0.324 
GM and Biotech different (=1) 0.447 0.498 
Informed about biotechnology before exp. 0.409 0.492 
Informed about acrylamide before exp. 0.099 0.299 
  Location 
Los Angeles 0.345 0.476 
Boston 0.318 0.466 
  Information Statements 
Scientific Perspective 0.136 0.344 
Industry Perspective 0.139 0.346 
Company Perspective 0.089 0.286 
Industry followed by Scientific Perspective 0.067 0.250 
Scientific followed by Industry Perspective 0.060 0.237 
Scientific followed by Environmental 
Perspective 
0.052 0.222 
Environmental followed by Scientific 
Perspective 
0.047 0.212 
Industry followed by Environmental Perspective 0.055 0.227 
Environmental followed by Industry Perspective 0.057 0.232 
Company followed by Environmental 
Perspective 
0.040 0.196 
Environmental followed by Company 
Perspective 
0.040 0.196 
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Table 2.2 Mean Bid Differences 
Bid differences, WTP pre - WTP post information N Mean Std Dev 
  All Bidders  
Conventional potatoes 403 0.060 1.246 
Biotech potatoes 403 0.177 1.543 
Conventional French fries 301 0.160 1.164 
Biotech French fries 301 0.197 1.369 
Conventional potato chips 301 0.087 1.011 
Biotech potato chips 301 0.072 1.189 
Conventional potato dices  102 0.046 1.157 
Biotech potato dices 102 0.356 1.048 
  Bidders receiving environmental-only perspective 
Conventional potatoes 88 0.108 1.710 
Biotech potatoes 88 1.155 1.952 
Conventional French fries 54 0.261 1.692 
Biotech French fries 54 1.040 1.847 
Conventional potato chips 54 0.171 1.277 
Biotech potato chips 54 0.777 1.465 
Conventional potato dices  34 0.218 1.227 
Biotech potato dices 34 0.731 1.095 
  Bidders receiving industry-only perspective 
Conventional potatoes 56 0.253 0.688 
Biotech potatoes 56 -0.007 1.231 
Conventional French fries 56 0.201 0.650 
Biotech French fries 56 0.192 1.238 
Conventional potato chips 56 0.065 0.657 
Biotech potato chips 56 0.062 0.939 
  Bidders receiving science-only perspective 
Conventional potatoes 55 0.278 1.160 
Biotech potatoes 55 -0.546 1.335 
Conventional French fries 55 0.260 0.966 
Biotech French fries 55 -0.301 1.227 
Conventional potato chips 55 0.261 0.870 
Biotech potato chips 55 -0.359 1.271 
  Bidders receiving company-only perspective 
Conventional potatoes 36 -0.092 0.687 
Biotech potatoes 36 -0.193 1.274 
Conventional potato dices 36 -0.034 1.068 
Biotech potato dices 36 -0.039 0.834 
  Bidders receiving industry followed by science perspective 
Conventional potatoes 27 0.337 0.616 
Biotech potatoes 27 -0.290 0.739 
Conventional French fries 27 0.263 0.644 
Biotech French fries 27 -0.254 0.813 
Conventional potato chips 27 0.160 0.572 
Biotech potato chips 27 -0.432 0.842 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
Bid differences, WTP pre - WTP post information N Mean Std Dev 
  Bidders receiving science followed by industry perspective  
Conventional potatoes 24 0.124 0.850 
Biotech potatoes 24 -0.595 0.756 
Conventional French fries 24 0.167 0.975 
Biotech French fries 24 -0.509 0.882 
Conventional potato chips 24 0.258 0.780 
Biotech potato chips 24 -0.506 0.829 
  Bidders receiving industry followed by environmental perspective 
Conventional potatoes 22 -0.117 0.944 
Biotech potatoes 22 0.567 0.768 
Conventional French fries 22 0.157 0.714 
Biotech French fries 22 0.457 1.103 
Conventional potato chips 22 0.038 0.495 
Biotech potato chips 22 0.245 0.443 
  Bidders receiving environmental followed by industry perspective 
Conventional potatoes 23 -0.650 2.127 
Biotech potatoes 23 -0.004 1.231 
Conventional French fries 23 -0.233 1.896 
Biotech French fries 23 0.401 1.219 
Conventional potato chips 23 -0.440 1.927 
Biotech potato chips 23 0.180 1.094 
  Bidders receiving science followed by environmental perspective 
Conventional potatoes 21 -0.226 1.210 
Biotech potatoes 21 0.191 1.098 
Conventional French fries 21 -0.190 1.179 
Biotech French fries 21 0.252 0.766 
Conventional potato chips 21 -0.211 0.995 
Biotech potato chips 21 0.380 0.701 
  Bidders receiving environmental followed by science perspective  
Conventional potatoes 19 -0.289 1.411 
Biotech potatoes 19 0.184 2.386 
Conventional French fries 19 0.177 1.132 
Biotech French fries 19 0.186 1.467 
Conventional potato chips 19 0.121 0.924 
Biotech potato chips 19 0.123 1.575 
  Bidders receiving company followed by environmental perspective  
Conventional potatoes 16 -0.022 0.855 
Biotech potatoes 16 -0.262 0.774 
Conventional potato dices  16 -0.294 0.825 
Biotech potato dices 16 0.079 0.737 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
Bid differences, WTP pre - WTP post information N Mean Std Dev 
  Bidders receiving environmental followed by company perspective 
Conventional potatoes 16 0.294 0.737 
Biotech potatoes 16 0.842 1.339 
Conventional potato dices  16 0.204 1.456 
Biotech potato dices 16 0.721 1.295 
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Table 2.3 Probit results: Probability of WTP more for biotech (and conventional) 
potatoes after information 
 Biotech Conventional 
Biotech and GM are different -0.0463 
(-0.017) 
-0.3198 
(-0.114) 
* 
Informed about biotechnology 
before information 
0.4030 
(0.150) 
** 0.1508 
(0.053) 
Informed about acrylamide before 
information 
-0.1247 
(-0.450) 
-0.0662 
(-0.024) 
Industry Perspective 1.0988 
(0.417) 
** -0.3622 
(-0.135) 
Science Perspective 1.3500 
(0.499) 
** -0.5395 
(-0.204) 
* 
Industry followed by Science 
Perspective 
1.4007 
(0.507) 
** -1.0669 
(-0.406) 
** 
Science followed by industry 
perspective 
1.4923 
(0.530) 
** 0.3309 
(0.108) 
Industry followed by 
Environmental Perspective 
-0.6076 
(-0.192) 
-0.2415 
(-0.090) 
Environmental followed by 
Industry perspective 
0.8703 
(0.337) 
* 0.1781 
(0.061) 
Science followed by 
environmental perspective 
0.7262 
(0.283) 
* -0.1934 
(-0.071) 
Environmental followed by 
Science perspective 
0.3262 
(0.126) 
0.0003 
(0.0001) 
Company Perspective 1.1778 
(0.443) 
** 0.1414 
(0.049) 
Company followed by 
environmental perspective 
0.7472 
(0.291) 
-0.1352 
(-0.049) 
Environmental followed by 
company perspective 
0.3784 
(0.146) 
0.0886 
(0.031) 
330 Session 0.1161 
(0.043) 
-0.0453 
(-0.016) 
Boston 0.2577 
(0.096) 
-0.1886 
(-0.068) 
LA 0.4223 
(0.158) 
* -0.0775 
(-0.028) 
Monitor 0.1526 
(0.056) 
-0.1884 
(-0.067) 
_cons -1.6033 ** 0.9410 ** 
N 403  403  
𝑅2  0.158  0.065  
* significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level 
Marginal effects in parentheses 
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Table 2.4 Probit results: Probability of WTP more for biotech (and conventional) 
French fries after information 
 Biotech Conventional 
Biotech and GM are different 0.1208 
(0.043) 
-0.2021 
(-0.078) 
Informed about biotechnology 
before information 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
-0.1431 
(-0.055) 
Informed about acrylamide before 
information 
-0.0623 
(-0.022) 
0.4424 
(0.159) 
Industry Perspective 0.6961 
(0.262) 
* -0.2378 
(-0.093) 
Science Perspective 0.9935 
(0.375) 
** -0.3892 
(-0.153) 
Industry followed by Science 
Perspective 
1.1408 
(0.431) 
** -0.4793 
(-0.189) 
Science followed by industry 
perspective 
1.3766 
(0.507) 
** -0.2706 
(-0.106) 
Industry followed by 
Environmental Perspective 
-0.0445 
(-0.016) 
-0.4303 
(-0.170) 
Environmental followed by 
Industry perspective 
0.0476 
(0.017) 
-0.1909 
(-0.075) 
Science followed by 
environmental perspective 
0.5002 
(0.190) 
-0.0409 
(-0.016) 
Environmental followed by 
Science perspective 
0.2298 
(0.085) 
-0.1458 
(-0.057) 
Boston 0.3553 
(0.129) 
-0.1674 
(-0.065) 
LA 0.3402 
(0.123) 
-0.0860 
(-0.033) 
Monitor 0.2095 
(0.074) 
-0.2100 
(-0.081) 
Constant -1.4498 ** 0.7938 ** 
N 301  301  
𝑅2  0.110  0.027  
* significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level 
Marginal effects in parentheses 
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Table 2.5 Probit results: Probability of WTP more for biotech (and conventional) 
potato chips after information 
 Biotech Conventional 
Biotech and GM are different 0.0296 
(0.011) 
-0.3697 
(-0.142) 
* 
Informed about biotechnology 
before information 
0.1485 
(0.053) 
0.0227 
(0.009) 
Informed about acrylamide before 
information 
0.1750 
(0.064) 
0.1359 
(0.051) 
Industry Perspective 0.6716 
(0.255) 
* -0.1930 
(-0.075) 
Science Perspective 0.9943 
(0.377) 
** -0.4266 
(-0.167) 
Industry followed by Science 
Perspective 
1.313 
(0.488) 
** -0.6080 
(-0.239) 
* 
Science followed by industry 
perspective 
1.2699 
(0.474) 
** -0.2710 
(-0.106) 
Industry followed by 
Environmental Perspective 
-0.0488 
(-0.017) 
-0.3281 
(-0.129) 
Environmental followed by 
Industry perspective 
0.0942 
(0.034) 
-0.1753 
(-0.068) 
Science followed by 
environmental perspective 
0.3153 
(0.119) 
0.1573 
(0.059) 
Environmental followed by 
Science perspective 
0.5627 
(0.216) 
-0.1422 
(-0.055) 
Boston 0.1891 
(0.069) 
0.1100 
(0.042) 
LA 0.2725 
(0.099) 
0.0603 
(0.023) 
Monitor 0.1437 
(0.051) 
-0.1286 
(-0.049) 
Constant -1.3798 ** 0.6514 ** 
N 301  301  
𝑅2  0.108  0.031  
* significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level 
Marginal effects in parentheses 
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Table 2.6 Probit results: Probability of WTP more for biotech (and conventional) 
potato dices after information 
 Biotech Conventional 
Biotech and GM are different -0.5127 
(-0.153) 
0.3209 
(0.104) 
Informed about biotechnology 
before information 
0.3954 
(0.125) 
0.2452 
(0.079) 
Informed about acrylamide before 
information 
-0.0173 
(-0.005) 
-0.8989 
(-0.339) 
Company Perspective 1.1420 
(0.377) 
** 0.5023 
(0.157) 
Company followed by 
environmental perspective 
0.6764 
(0.236) 
0.6600 
(0.183) 
Environmental followed by 
company perspective 
-0.0231 
(-0.007) 
0.0617 
(0.020) 
Boston -0.5389 
(-0.153) 
-0.8636 
(-0.303) 
* 
LA 0.5276 
(0.171) 
-0.8525 
(-0.297) 
* 
Monitor -0.3147 
(-0.097) 
0.1159 
(0.038) 
Constant -1.0046 * 0.6457 
N 102  102  
𝑅2  0.199  0.122  
* significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level 
Marginal effect in parentheses 
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Table 2.7 Changes in self-reported knowledge of biotechnology 
 
Informed about biotech after info 
when previously uninformed 
More informed about 
biotech after information 
Income 0.000003 
(0.0000) 
* 
--  
  0.000002 
(0.000) 
--  
 
Male -0.2917 
(0.1358) 
* 
-- 
 -0.2921 
(0.1374) 
* 
-- 
 
Age -0.0151 
(0.0049) 
** 
-- 
 -0.0199 
(0.0051) 
*
* 
-- 
 
Years of Education -0.0957 
(0.0334) 
** 
-- 
 -0.0570 
(0.3368) 
-- 
 
Reads food labels -0.3405 
(0.2063) 
-- 
 -0.4337 
(0.2208) 
* 
-- 
 
Biotech and GM are different -0.2038 
(0.1327) 
-- 
 -0.0454 
(0.1358) 
-- 
 
Industry Perspective -0.1456 
(0.2224) 
-0.1802 
(0.2152) 
-0.1018 
(0.2232) 
-0.1413 
(0.2154) 
Science Perspective -0.1750 
(0.2249) 
-0.1171 
(0.2162) 
-0.1746 
(0.2267) 
-0.1184 
(0.2171) 
Industry followed by Science 
Perspective 
0.1410 
(0.2976) 
0.1395 
(0.2763) 
0.1400 
(0.3001) 
* 0.1979 
(0.2834) 
Science followed by industry 
perspective 
0.1871 
(0.3032) 
0.1141 
(0.2898) 
0.4245 
(0.3149) 
0.3260 
(03027.) 
Industry followed by 
Environmental Perspective 
0.3949 
(0.3141) 
0.3632 
(0.3057) 
0.9176 
(0.3701) 
0.8752 
(0.3606) 
* 
Environmental followed by 
Industry perspective 
0.1742 
(0.3038) 
0.1734 
(0.2942) 
0.1136 
(0.3132) 
0.1669 
(0.3001) 
Science followed by 
environmental perspective 
-0.1423 
(0.3139) 
-0.1910 
(0.3073) 
0.0924 
(0.3193) 
0.0710 
(0.3106) 
Environmental followed by 
Science perspective 
0.0261 
(0.3296) 
-0.0554 
(0.3181) 
0.0760 
(0.3319) 
-0.0236 
(0.3208) 
Company Perspective 0.0364 
(0.2536) 
-0.0002 
(0.2489) 
0.0909 
(0.2564) 
0.0521 
(0.2519) 
Company followed by 
environmental perspective 
0.3756 
(0.3550) 
0.3086 
(0.3442) 
0.1180 
(0.3569) 
0.0791 
(0.3448) 
Environmental followed by 
company perspective 
0.1873 
(0.3587) 
0.1518 
(0.3432) 
0.0965 
(0.3680) 
0.0851 
(0.3479) 
Boston -0.1573 
(0.1706) 
-0.0942 
(0.1554) 
-0.1190 
(0.1751) 
-0.0310 
(0.1591) 
LA -0.1329 
(0.1603) 
-0.2210 
(0.1524) 
-0.1227 
(0.1637) 
-0.1794 
(0.1550) 
Constant 2.3381 
(0.5485) 
** 0.1053 
(0.1600) 
2.3146 
(0.5530) 
0.3019 
(0.1625) 
* 
𝑅2  0.070  0.014  0.080  0.023  
* significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level 
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Table 2.8 Changes in self-reported knowledge of acrylamide 
 
Informed about acrylamide after 
info when previously uninformed 
More informed about 
acrylamide after info 
Income 0.000001 
(0.0000) 
--   
0.000002 
(0.0000) 
--  
Male 0.0737 
(0.1521) 
--  
0.1525 
(0.1856) 
--  
Age 0.0024 
(0.0056) 
--  
-0.0078 
(0.0068) 
--  
Years of Education -0.0205 
(0.0380) 
--  
-0.0228 
(0.0469) 
--  
Reads food labels 0.0856 
(0.2280) 
--  
0.1411 
(0.2674) 
--  
Biotech and GM are different 0.0927 
(0.1495) 
--  
-0.0676 
(0.1781) 
--  
Industry Perspective 1.1419 
(0.2396) 
** 1.1619 
(0.2368) 
** 0.9979 
(0.2976) 
** 0.9697 
(0.2899) 
** 
Science Perspective 1.2281 
(0.2469) 
** 1.2717 
(0.2437) 
** 0.7707 
(0.2802) 
** 0.8323 
(0.2756) 
** 
Industry followed by Science 
Perspective 
1.7718 
(0.3986) 
** 1.7372 
(0.3829) 
** 1.2294 
(0.4904) 
* 1.2827 
(0.4701) 
** 
Science followed by industry 
perspective 
1.4628 
(0.3624) 
** 1.4817 
(0.3597) 
** 0.9375 
(0.4056) 
* 0.8919 
(0.3945) 
* 
Industry followed by 
Environmental Perspective 
1.0916 
(0.3398) 
** 1.0930 
(0.3328) 
** 0.8262 
(0.4139) 
* 0.8674 
(0.4069) 
* 
Environmental followed by 
Industry perspective 
1.1283 
(0.3303) 
** 1.1128 
(0.3269) 
** 0.8820 
(0.4061) 
* 0.8772 
(0.3994) 
* 
Science followed by 
environmental perspective 
1.1408 
(0.3497) 
** 1.1780 
(0.3474) 
** 1.1820 
(0.4975) 
* 1.1580 
(0.4886) 
* 
Environmental followed by 
Science perspective 
0.9161 
(0.3478) 
** 0.9586 
(0.3429) 
** 0.8328 
(0.4300) 
0.7817 
(0.4179) 
* 
Company Perspective 1.3867 
(0.3055) 
** 1.4237 
(0.3023) 
** 1.0680 
(0.3761) 
** 1.1136 
(0.3743) 
** 
Company followed by 
environmental perspective 
1.2072 
(0.3927) 
** 1.1680 
(0.3872) 
** 1.0861 
(0.5239) 
* 1.0102 
(0.5071) 
* 
Environmental followed by 
company perspective 
1.4131 
(0.4326) 
** 1.4453 
(0.4274) 
** 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Boston -0.1285 
(0.1983) 
-0.0924 
(0.1863) 
-0.1769 
(0.2392) 
-0.0842 
(0.2219) 
LA -0.4712 
(0.1825) 
* -0.4296 
(0.1755) 
* -0.2923 
(0.2202) 
-0.2497 
(0.2108) 
Constant -0.1540 
(0.5974) 
-0.1139 
(0.1704) 
1.0326 
(0.7293) 
0.6174 
(0.1889) 
** 
𝑅2  0.164  0.159  0.119  0.108  
* significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level 
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Figure 2.3 Information Statement - Environmental Perspective 
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Figure 2.4 Information Statement - Industry Perspective 
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Figure 2.5 Information Statement - Scientific Perspective 
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Figure 2.6 Information Statement - Company Perspective 
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CHAPTER 3.    CONSUMER DEMAND FOR POTATO PRODUCTS AND 
WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY FOR LOW-ACRYLAMIDE, SULFITE-FREE, FRESH 
POTATO DICES: EVIDENCE FROM LAB AUCTIONS9 
Katherine Lacy and Wallace E. Huffman10 
 
Introduction 
Potatoes remain a key vegetable in the American diet, being consumed as boiled, 
steamed, baked and fried whole potatoes, hash browns, French fries and potato chips. White 
potatoes are used largely for these purposes. Per capita use of white potatoes in 2013 is 
approximately the same as in 1980, about 115 lbs. per year, but the share going to processed 
foods increased from 53% to 69%. Since some of the potato is lost in processing waste, per 
capita consumption of white potatoes has actually declined over this period (NRC 2015). 
Richards et al. (1997) summarize factors affecting the aggregate demand for potatoes, but 
very limited up-to-date research exists on factors that affect individual household demand for 
fresh or processed potatoes in the United States. 
In 2002, acrylamide was first identified in starchy foods cooked at high temperatures 
(Tareke 2002).  This included high temperature cooking of traditional white potatoes, as in 
frying, baking or roasting to make fries, hash browns and chips, acrylamide is formed.11 
Acrylamide is a naturally occurring chemical when asparagine, an amino acid, and reducing 
sugars (fructose and glucose) are heated to above 250oF, such as in frying, baking and 
roasting. Once formed, acrylamide is a stable compound. The Maillard reaction, which 
                                                 
9 This chapter is reproduced from the published paper, Lacy, K. & Huffman, W. E. (2016). Consumer demand 
for potato products and willingness-to-pay for low-acrylamide, sulfite-free fresh potatoes and dices: evidence 
from lab auctions. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 41(1), 116-137. 
10 Graduate student and Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and Life Sciences, 
respectively. Department of Economics, Iowa State University. 
11 Acrylamide does not exist in fresh potatoes or in boiled or steamed potatoes. 
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produces acrylamide, also produces the dark-colored pigments or browning of French fries, 
chips and hash browns (Bethke and Bussan 2013). In general, the acrylamide content rises 
with the darkening of the pigment. In addition, retail fresh cut white potatoes are treated with 
sodium bisulfite to retard bruising and blackening when exposed to the air (oxygen). 
Both acrylamide and sulfites raise food safety concerns. Based largely on animal studies, 
acrylamide is a neuro-toxin and potential carcinogen in humans. Moreover, as a result of a 
broad 2005 lawsuit brought by the State of California under Proposition 65 against the U.S. 
potato industry, many California restaurants are required to post signs that potato products 
that have browned in the cooking process contain acrylamide, a cancer-causing agent 
(California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment). In addition, the U.S. potato 
industry has a mandate to largely eliminate acrylamide from potato products sold in 
California (California Department of Justice 2008), and it is working to lower acrylamide 
formation in processed potato products. Sodium bisulfite is a controversial preservative 
because some people are allergic to sulfides (Rangan 2010).  
Biotech methods have been used to eliminate these two health risks in white 
potatoes.12 Changes in potato growing and storage practices and conventional breeding of 
potatoes have been unsuccessful in bringing significant reductions in acrylamide content in 
high-temperature cooked potato products or darkening of fresh-cut potatoes. However, 
scientists have been successful in using genetic engineering of potatoes to significantly 
reduce acrylamide formation in potato products (Bethke and Bussan 2013). But the new low-
acrylamide potatoes also have the advantage of low bruising and blackening of fresh-cut 
potatoes, and potato waste associated with processed potato products. Hence, no sodium 
                                                 
12 In two decades of human consumption of GM foods, no food safety problems have arisen.  
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bisulfate is needed to reduce bruising and blackening in the new biotech fresh-cut potatoes. 
Hence, the new biotech potatoes reduce two types of food safety concerns—a major 
accomplishment.  
In earlier lab auctions of genetically modified (GM) foods potentially carrying traits for 
herbicide tolerance and/or insect resistance, Huffman et al. (2003) and Rousu et al. (2007) 
found significant labeling and information treatment effects on willingness-to-pay (WTP) for 
GM foods.  Huffman et al. (2003) found that most participants consistently bid less for 
products carrying GM food labels compared to products with conventional labels.  However, 
the authors did not test for information treatment effects. In a later study, Rousu et al. (2007) 
examined both the effects of food labels and pre-packaged information on WTP 
differences—WTP for the conventional type minus WTP for the GM type. They found 
positive effects of pro-biotech information and negative effects of anti-biotech information 
on WTP differences.  Colson et al. (2011) found that subjects were willing to pay more for 
fresh vegetables enhanced with antioxidants and vitamin C (consumer-oriented traits) using 
biotech methods. 
The objective of this study is to assess consumer demand for traditional whole fresh 
white potatoes and processed potato products and WTP for new experimental fresh whole 
potatoes and potato dices that have low-acrylamide-forming and browning/bruising potential 
due to biotech advances. In addition, we examine the effects of food labeling and pre-
packaged information on WTP for new potato products.  To do this, we design an 
experimental lab auction and recruit a sample of 102 adult consumers (subjects) from three 
different regions of the U.S. to come to a central location in their area, a lab, to provide us 
with socio-economic information about themselves and their households and participate in 
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our experimental auctions. Each of the subjects, 18-65 years of age, were paid 65 dollars for 
participating in the experiment.  
  Our empirical results show that the demand for traditional fresh potatoes and 
processed potato products is not responsive to subject’s household income. However, 
households with more adults are more likely to consume fresh potatoes and French fries but 
not chips. This result may be driven by falling per capita household income as the number of 
adults per household increases. There is no significant effect of a subject’s education on 
potato demand—fresh or processed. Subject’s age has a significant quadratic effect on the 
demand for chips and fries but not for fresh potatoes. Surprising is that other things being 
equal, Boston and Los Angeles households are more likely to consume processed potato 
products (chips and fries) regularly than are Des Moines area households.  
Our empirical results show that WTP differences for new experimental biotech fresh 
Russet potatoes and dices are also not significantly affected by household income. Compared 
to women, male subjects are willing to pay less for biotech potato products after receiving an 
industry perspective on using biotechnology to reduce acrylamide and sulfide exposure 
relative to WTP pre-information. Other socio-demographic factors do not matter for 
explaining these WTP differences. However, subjects who are informed about biotech foods 
pre-experiment are willing to pay more for the new experimental potato products than others. 
Also, subjects that receive the company perspective on using biotechnology to create low-
acrylamide, sulfite-free fresh potatoes and fresh dices are willing to pay significantly more 
than those that receive the environmental group perspective. Hence, subjects are willing to 
pay for improved food safety achieved using biotechnology to improve the consumer 
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attributes of fresh potatoes, a long-term traditional vegetable consumed in large quantities in 
the United States and on fresh potato dices, a totally new test food product.  
Description of the Experiments 
Experiments were planned for and conducted in the Boston, MA; Des Moines, IA; 
and Los Angeles, CA areas on a Saturday in April or May 2014. Survey and Behavioral 
Research Services (SBRS), Iowa State University, developed the protocol for recruiting 
subjects for this project. The target subjects were 18-65 years of age.13 Potential participants 
were told that an Iowa State University project was recruiting subjects to participate in 
sessions on how households select food and household products. In particular, they were told 
that the sessions involved a food preference experiment set up like an auction, the sessions 
would take about 75 minutes of their time, and they would be paid $65 for participating in 
the project. Also, they needed to be able to follow instructions and write in English and be 
willing to come to a common location in their area for a 3:30PM session. Willing subjects 
were told that they would receive follow up confirmation of time and place.14  
  At each location, the lab was laid out in classroom style with a display table in the 
front of the room. Practice-round and experimental products were placed on the table before 
subjects were admitted to the lab. Experimental potato products were placed in clear plastic 
bags with experimental food labels. To avoid distractions to the subjects, no trademark, brand  
 
                                                 
13 When subjects are younger than 18 years of age or older than 65 years of age, the IRB requires that special 
procedures be followed to meet their special needs. 
14 To recruit subjects in the Boston area, we worked through Answer Quest, and in the Los Angeles area, we 
worked through Focus & Testing.  Answer Quest and Focus & Testing are food marketing and testing 
companies that have accumulated databases of more than 50,000 individuals and 120,000 individuals, 
respectively, who had participated in earlier marketing research projects and agreed to be contacted for future 
projects. Individuals from these databases were called by employees of Answer Quest or Focus & Testing and 
read the common protocol for recruitment and follow up. 
 
45 
 
or other information was on the bags.  Experimental products were covered by blue bins 
placed on the table in the front of the lab.  
At each starting time, two concurrent sessions took place, and subjects were 
alternately assigned to each of them; Session A or Session B.  Each session was conducted 
by a session monitor (remained the same for every location) and one assistant.  The sessions 
consisted of the same exact 10 steps, which can be seen in Figure 3.1.  In Step 1, the subjects 
were greeted by a receptionist and asked to read and sign an informed consent form.  Once 
the form was completed, the subjects were assigned an ID number, handed a packet of 
project materials, and told to enter the lab and take a seat.15 While waiting for the experiment 
to start, subjects were asked to complete a pre-auction questionnaire that collected socio-
economic information and information about use of food labels while shopping for food 
products. In addition, subjects were asked to rate their knowledge about biotech foods, non-
biotech foods, and acrylamide before the experiments.16 This covers the type of pre-auction 
information collected.  To relieve subjects’ concerns about a credit constraint in the 
experiment, each subject was, at this point, paid $65 for participating in the experiments and 
asked to sign a receipt. 
  In Step 2 subjects were informed that they would be participating in an auction, and 
that there would be two practice rounds of bidding to learn the auction mechanism.  Subjects 
were told that it was always in their best interest to bid their true preferences.  Subjects were  
 
                                                 
15 Individuals who arrived together, e.g., a husband and wife, or mother and daughter, etc., were assigned to 
different sessions. 
16 By asking about knowledge in more than one area, we believe that any one of these questions is unlikely to 
bias our experimental results. Also, those subjects that indicate that biotechnology and GMOs are different are 
anticipated to be more informed about this area of science than others. 
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asked to direct all questions to the monitor and to refrain from communicating with other 
subjects.  
Next, the session monitor read through an explanation of the random n-th price 
auction and addressed any questions raised by the subjects. The auction was explained in 5 
easy steps: 1) subjects would be asked to come to the front of the room and examine 
product(s) on a display table, 2) subjects were to return to their seat and write down, on a bid 
sheet attached in their packet, the bid for the product(s), 3) bid sheets were to be collected by 
the session monitor and assistant, the binding round (when more than one round of bidding 
occurs) would be randomly selected,  bid prices would then be ranked from highest to lowest 
for each product, and, 4) the random n to determine the winners was then selected, and 5) the 
monitor will notify winners for each product using ID numbers. The session monitors 
informed subjects that it was in their best interest to bid how much they truly valued each 
product. 
In Step 3, bidding on a single product, a generic ceramic coffee mug, was conducted 
to get the subjects familiar with the auction mechanism.  Subjects were asked to come up to 
the front of the room, one-by-one, to view the product and then return to their seats.17 They 
were told to fill out a bid sheet attached to their packet, detach it and place it face down on 
the table in front of them. The monitor and assistant collected the bid sheets and recorded the 
bids and ID number for each bidder in an excel spreadsheet.  The bids were then ranked from 
highest to lowest.  The rank of the winning bid was determined by randomly drawing a 
number from a uniform distribution over 2 to k, where k is the number of subjects in a 
session. The random number, n, determined the rank of the random price. For example, if 
                                                 
17 We used non-food items in our practice rounds so as to reduce impacts on later bids on experimental products 
(Nunes and Boatwright 2004).  
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𝑘 = 16 and the random n is 4, the 3 subjects that bid strictly higher than the random price 
were the winners, and they paid the random price (4th highest price). These ranked bids with 
ID numbers and random n-th price were displaced on a screen in front of the room.    
In Step 4, subjects were asked to complete a short, four question quiz on the auction 
format, and the session monitor reviewed the answers and addressed questions. After 
questions from this round were resolved, the monitor moved on to Step 5, the second practice 
round, which was to get them familiar with bidding on two products at a time. The products 
were: a notepad and package of pens.    
In Step 6, subjects placed bids on real experimental products: two rounds of bidding 
on a 5-pound bag of traditional and biotech Russet Potatoes and 12 ounces of fresh cut potato 
dices.  To ease budget constraint issues, subjects were told that winners of these auctions 
would purchase at most one unit of each of the commodities (a 5lb bag of potatoes, a 12 oz. 
bag of dices).  In round 1, the products carried either a conventional or biotech food label 
(see Figure 3.2).18 The order in which subjects saw either conventional or biotech products 
was randomized to minimize order effects in bidding. Subjects were asked to come to the 
front of the room, view the products, return to their seats, and place their bids on bid sheets. 
Once completed, the bid sheets were collected by the monitor and assistant.  In round 2, the 
participants were asked to bid on the same type of products as round 1 but this time the 
products were conventional if they were biotech in round one and vice versa. 
In Step 7, subjects were asked to read the information statement(s) included in their 
packet. They were given about 10 minutes to do this. Each subject was randomly assigned to 
an information treatment group, which determined the information statements they received.  
                                                 
18 A private food company supplied the project with experimental products for the lab displaces that were 
authentic and matched the contents stated on the food labels. 
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The information treatments consisted of two different perspectives: a (positive) company 
perspective on using biotechnology to reduce bruising of potatoes in storage and processing 
and acrylamide levels in processed potato products and a (negative) environmental group 
perspective on biotechnology. A third information-treatment group was provided both 
perspectives.19  See Figure 3.3. After Step 7, the subjects moved on to Step 8 where they 
placed rounds 3 and 4 bids on experimental products.  As with Step 6, the only difference 
between rounds 3 and 4 was whether the subjects saw food labels showing conventional 
products or biotechnology products first (which was randomized). 
 After all bids from Step 8 were collected by the monitor and assistant, subjects moved 
on to Step 9 where they were asked to complete a short post-auction questionnaire.  There 
were questions about household consumption patterns for potatoes and potato products, how 
well the subject understood the information treatment that they received and read, and how 
well the subject was informed about biotechnology and acrylamide after participating in the 
auction and reading the information treatment included in their packet.  While the 
participants were completing the questionnaire, the monitor and assistant were inputting the 
bids for experimental products into a computer spreadsheet.  
In Step 10, subjects were informed that the biotechnology products were not currently 
available in grocery stores and that winners would receive conventional potato products 
obtained from a local grocery store.  The monitor then randomly chose the binding round 
from the two rounds of bidding on the conventional products, displayed the ranked bids for 
this round for both products, and then chose the random price or random n.20 Winners were 
                                                 
19 Some environmental groups, e.g., Greenpeace and Friends-of-the-Earth, have a strong negative perspective 
on GMOs and biotechnology in general, while others have a more moderated view (Greenpeace 2014; Friends-
of-the-Earth 2014). 
20 For winners of fresh-cut potato dices, they received a 12 oz package of a close substitute, Simply PotatoesTM, 
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then identified.  Monitors and assistants then collected packets from the subjects in the 
session, the winners were escorted to the stock room to purchase the products, and the 
subjects who did not win were told that they were dismissed and free to leave. 
Description of the Sample and Summary Results 
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for socio-economic attributes of the 102 
subjects and potato consumption frequency for subjects’ households. Some highlights for 
these statistics follow. The average age of subjects was 43 years, and 39% of the subjects 
were male.21 The mean education of subjects was 14 years, which is equivalent to a 2-year 
college degree. Eighty-seven percent of the subjects were white and 50% were married.22 
The average number of adults in the subject’s household was 2.2, of children less than 8 
years was 0.20 and children 8 years or older was 0.56. Thirteen percent of subjects reported 
being a blue-collar worker, and mean household income of subjects was $72,300.23 Also, 
93% reported that they exercise weekly, only 9% reported that they smoked cigarettes, and 
79% of subjects indicated that they were in good to excellent health.  Thirty-five percent of 
subjects indicated that someone in their household was on a diet.  
Regarding potato consumption, 93% of the subjects reported that their household 
consumed potatoes weekly; 82% reported consuming potato chips regularly and 60% 
reported consuming French fries regularly. Given that we did not screen subjects for 
household potato product consumption, this high frequency of potato consumption in the  
 
                                                 
a product available in the dairy case of major grocery stores and super markets.    
21 Approximately 60% of grocery store shoppers are women. 
22 The large share of subjects who are white, even for the Boston and Los Angeles areas, can be explained by 
the fact that recruiters of subjects screened for ability to communicate in English. 
23 A blue-collar worker was defined as anyone with an occupation of “building and grounds cleaning and 
maintenance,” “construction/installation/repair,” “farming/fishing/forestry,” “production/manufacturing,” or 
“transportation.” 
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sample is good news for those worrying about the ability to generalize our results—at least to 
the population of people who can communicate in English. 
In the pre-auction questionnaire, 6% of the subjects reported that they were informed 
about acrylamide and 38% reported that they were informed about biotechnology. In the 
experiments, 35% of subjects received the company perspective, 33% received the 
environmental perspective and 31% received both perspectives. 
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics of the subjects’ bids by product and 
information treatment. In bidding rounds 1 and 2 (which are before packaged information 
treatment were injected into the experiment), the average bid for conventional potatoes (5 lb. 
bag) was $2.71 and the average bid for biotechnology potatoes (5 lb. bag) was $2.87.  Hence, 
the average bid was 16 cents per bag higher for biotechnology than conventional potatoes, 
pre-information treatment. After each subject read his or her information treatment, the 
average bid for conventional potatoes was $2.69 per bag, and the average bid for 
biotechnology potatoes was $2.50 per bag. Hence, the average subject’s bid for a bag of 
conventional potatoes was 2 cents lower after she received an information treatment than 
before, and for biotech potatoes the average bid was 37 cents per bag lower after receiving 
the information treatment than before.  These results imply that the negative information 
treatments had stronger effects on bidding behavior than positive information.  In addition, 
the average bid for a bag of conventional potatoes was 19 cents higher than for the 
biotechnology potato after subjects received an information treatment. 
The conventional fresh potato dices were treated with a chemical called sodium 
bisulfide to prevent them from turning an unattractive brown color, and “sodium bisulfide” 
content was clearly presented on the label (see Figure 3.2).  Before information treatment, the 
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average subject’s bid for conventional potato dices (12 oz. bag) was $1.82 and the average 
bid for a bag of biotechnology potato dices treated with sulfites (12 oz. bag) was $2.13.  
Hence, the average subject’s bid for a bag of biotechnology dices (no sodium bisulfide 
treatment) was 31 cents higher than for conventional dices, pre-information treatment. After 
information treatment, the average subject’s bid for a bag of conventional potato dices was 
$1.77, and the average bid for a bag of biotechnology potato dices was $1.78.  Hence, the 
average subject’s bid for conventional potato dices was 5 cents per bag lower after the 
information treatment than before, and the average bid for biotechnology dices was 35 cents 
per bag lower.  The average bid for conventional potato dices was 1 cent per bag less than for 
a bag of biotechnology potato dices after the information treatment.24 
Regression Models 
First, a model of a household’s decision to consume potato products is presented, and 
it is followed by a model of a household’s willingness-to-pay for low acrylamide potato 
products. We specify a reference (no potato product consumed) household random indirect 
utility function  
𝑈𝑖0 = 𝑋𝑖0𝛽0 + 𝜇𝑖0 (3.1) 
0iU  is the utility of the i-th household when it does not consume a potato product, 0iX  
includes household income and prices of products purchased for consumption and socio-
economic variables that affect preferences. The far-right term io represents other 
individually small effects on 0 ,iU  and it has a zero mean, and 0  is a set of unknown 
coefficients.  
                                                 
24 We had very few zero bids and no cases where a subject bid zero on both products—whole potatoes and 
dices, GM or conventional. 
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In contrast, the household’s random indirect utility when its members choose to 
consume at least one unit of a potato product is 
𝑈𝑖1 = 𝑋𝑖1𝛽1 + 𝜇𝑖1 (3.2) 
1iU  is the utility of a household, given a decision to consume a potato product, 1iX includes 
household income and prices of potato products and other good purchased for consumption 
and socio-economic attributes that affect tastes, and 1i  represents other individually small 
effects on 1,iU  and it has a zero mean. The coefficient vector 1  is a set of unknown 
coefficients. 
 A household consumes one unit of a potato product when its indirect utility is larger 
for consuming than not consuming them. We define iD  = 1 if 0 1,i iU U  and it equals 0 
otherwise. Hence, the probability that 1iD =  can be represented as follows: 
𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑋𝑖0𝛽0 + 𝜇𝑖0 < 𝑋𝑖1𝛽1 + 𝜇𝑖1) 
= 𝑃𝑟(𝜇𝑖0 − 𝜇𝑖1 < 𝑋𝑖1𝛽1 − 𝑋𝑖0𝛽0) 
= 𝑃𝑟(𝜇𝑖 < 𝑋𝑖𝛽) 
= 𝐹(𝑋𝑖𝛽) 
(3.3) 
where F (•) is a distribution function evaluated at iX  .  Equation (3.3) provides the 
conceptual framework for a model explaining the probability that a subject’s household 
consumes a potato product over some time interval, say a week—one indication of the 
demand for a potato product. Equation (3.3) is fitted using the probit estimation routine, and 
then we calculate the marginal effect for each regressor.   
   In addition to household income, socio-economic variables included in X are number 
of adults, children under age 8 and children 8 years of age and older in the subject’s 
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household; whether anyone in the subject’s household is on a diet; and gender, age, 
education, marital status, and racial-ethnic background of subject. In addition, X includes 
dummy variables for whether the subject reads food labels on new purchases, exercises 
weekly, is in good health, and smokes cigarettes. We expect those subjects that have more 
education and read food labels when making new purchases will in general be more health 
conscious and be less likely to consume processed potatoes and potato products. We don’t 
directly have price data that the subject’s household faces for potato products, but we expect 
prices of potatoes, chips and fries to differ between (be higher in) rural than urban areas and 
in Boston and Los Angeles areas than in the Des Moines area. Hence, X also includes dummy 
variables for a subject’s rural-urban residence and location in the Boston area (vs Des 
Moines) and in the Los Angeles area (vs Des Moines). 
 Next, consider a model of willingness-to-pay for the g-th commodity, v-th variety, by 
the i-th subject receiving the j-th information treatment, .
gv
ijW  The commodities are a 5 lb. 
bag of fresh whole potatoes and 12 oz. bag of fresh cut potato dices. For fresh potatoes, the 
varieties (v) are conventional and low acrylamide achieved using “Potatoes grown with seed 
improved by biotechnology”, and for fresh cut potato dices the varieties are conventional 
(with sodium bisulfite) and low acrylamide and sulfite free (achieved using potatoes grown 
with seed improved by biotechnology).25 Each subject bids on a set of products before 
receiving a packaged information treatment, and then again after the injection of the 
informative treatment:  (1) an environmental group perspective on biotechnology (anti- 
 
                                                 
25 Sodium bisulfite is a preservative used in conventional dices to limit discoloration of the product when 
exposed to the air. 
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biotech), (2) a (positive biotech) company perspective on using biotechnology to lower 
bruising and acrylamide potential, or (3) both perspectives.   
We write WTP for the g-th commodity, v-th variety for the i-th subject receiving the 
j-type of information as: 
𝑊𝑖𝑗
𝑔𝑣 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑗
𝑔𝑣 + 𝜏1
𝑔𝑣𝐼𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑔𝑣
 (3.4) 
where iX  is a set of socio-economic attributes of the subject and his or her household, ijI  is 1 
for information treatment of “a company perspective on low bruising and low acrylamide 
potential using biotechnology” (treatment 2)  and 0 for receiving “an environmental group 
perspective on biotechnology” (treatment 1) or both perspectives (treatment 3).  The last term 
of equation (3.4), gv
ij , represents other individually small effects on 
gv
ijW  and has a zero 
mean.  The baseline model is achieved when the i-th individual engages in the first round of 
bidding (before information treatment):  
𝑊𝑖0
𝑔𝑣 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽0
𝑔𝑣 + 𝜀𝑖0
𝑔𝑣
 (3.5) 
In our experiments, each of the i subjects bid first on commodity g of variety v before 
information treatment and then a second time after receiving an information treatment. 
Following earlier studies, e.g., Hoffman et al. (1992) and Rousu et al. (2007), we convert the 
WTP model into one of WTP differences—WTP before relative to WTP after information 
treatment:  
𝑊𝑖0
𝑔𝑣 − 𝑊𝑖1
𝑔𝑣 = 𝑋𝑖(𝛽0
𝑔𝑣 − 𝛽1
𝑔𝑣) + 𝜏1
𝑔𝑣𝐼𝑖1 + 𝜀𝑖0
𝑔𝑣 − 𝜀𝑖1
𝑔𝑣 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽
𝑔𝑣 + 𝜏1
𝑔𝑣𝐼𝑖1 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑔𝑣
 (3.6) 
 where
gv = 
0 1( )
gv gv − and gvi = ( 0 1
gv gv
i i − ) and the last disturbance terms has a zero mean.  
The advantages to this specification include that the new dependent variable in equation (3.6) 
can be positive, zero, or negative, and hence, the disturbance of the random disturbance term 
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gv
i is more likely to be normally distributed than for .
gv
ij  Taking differences also removes 
any common individual fixed or random effects, including individual idiosyncrasies, which 
would otherwise be a possible source of biases in the estimated coefficients of the WTP 
equation (Greene 2003).   
 Socio-economic variables that are included in iX  are a subject’s household income; 
number of children less than age 8 in subject’s household; gender, age and years of schooling 
completed of subject; whether subject indicated that they were informed about acrylamide 
and biotechnology in the pre-auction survey, reads food labels when purchasing new food 
items, or viewed biotech and GMO foods as different, indicates that their household regularly 
consumes potatoes, and dummy variable for city location of subject (Des Moines, Boston or 
Los Angeles area). Subjects in households with children under 8 years of age may be more 
concerned about the food safety dimension of the food that they purchase in grocery stores, 
especially foods containing sulfites, than others. Because there is no scientific evidence of 
biotech foods being unsafe for human consumption, it is uncertain what effect food carrying 
the words “Made using potatoes growth with seed improved by biotechnology” in the label 
will have. Although the perspective presented by Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth are 
quite negative about GMOs, Colson et al (2011) show that in experimental lab auctions of 
GM products with enhanced antioxidants and vitamin C consumers are willing to pay more 
for the GM products achieved using genes from within the species (intragenic). Women are 
more intensely involved in food shopping than men, and this difference in experience could 
affect the size of WTP differences, but we do not know in what direction. A subject’s age is 
included to control for life-stage effects and to permit differences in WTP to occur by age.  
Individuals with more education are better able to read and digest consumer and food safety 
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information (Schultz 1975; Huffman 1974), and hence may show larger responsiveness to 
information treatments injected into the food experiments. The effect of a subject being 
informed about biotechnology could have a positive or negative effect on how they bid, but 
Rousu et al. (2007) found that those who were informed bid more for GM products. Those 
that read food labels may be more conscious shoppers, but uncertain as to how this attribute 
will affect bidding behavior.  Households that regularly consume potatoes may behave 
differently in bidding on potato products than other households because they have more 
information about their tastes. 
The locations of our food experiments are more than 1,300 miles apart and are in 
vastly different parts of the country where the daily attention to food production differs 
considerably. Iowa and California are large producers of food and agricultural products while 
farmers in Massachusetts are engaged in small-scale farming, including agro-tourism.  
Massachusetts is heavily urbanized and far from centers of U.S. large-scale food production. 
Hence, we expect Boston subjects to be most strongly anti-biotech.  In addition, three New 
England States have voted recently to require some type of mandatory labeling of GM foods. 
All state level votes in other regions of the US have failed (Huffman and McCluskey 2014). 
Regression results for probability of consumer potatoes, chips and fries 
The results from fitting the empirical probit model explaining the probability of a 
subject’s household consuming traditional potatoes and processed potato products weekly are 
reported in Table 3.4. A general model for equation (3.3) with 15 regressors, including city 
fixed effects and intercept term, is first fitted.  Then, variables having coefficients with 
unusually small z-values, implying that they are not significantly different from zero at even 
the 10% level, are deleted, except for a few core variables—household income, number of 
adults in household, and city dummies, and the model is re-fitted. The expectation is that the 
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size of the estimated coefficients that have large z-values at the first stage will be relatively 
unaffected when insignificant regressors are excluded, but that their z-values may increase in 
size due to less near-multicollinearity among the remaining set of regressors.26 
Fresh Potatoes 
In regression (1) of Table 3.4, there are 15 included regressors, largely socio-
economic variables, and in regression (2) five of the insignificant regressors are excluded.27  
The probit results and marginal effects are in Table 3.4.  In regression (2), a $1,000 per year 
increase in household annual income reduces the probability of a subject’s household 
consuming fresh potatoes slightly but not significantly.  Adding one adult to a subject’s 
household or a subject being married increases the probability of a subject’s household 
consuming potatoes by 3.0 and 5.2 percentage points, respectively.  Male subjects are 4.3 
percentage points less likely to be in a household that consumes potatoes than female 
subjects.  The marginal effects of a subject’s age on the probability of the household 
consuming potatoes increases from age 18 to 40, and then the probability of the household 
consuming potatoes decreases for subjects older than 40 and continues to decrease as age 
increases. However, this age effect is statistically weak.  If the subject reported someone in 
the household was on a diet, then the probability of consuming potatoes decreases by 2.8 
percentage points.  Because most diets suggest reducing carbohydrate intensive and high 
starch foods, this result is not surprising.  The probability is slightly higher for Boston and 
Los Angeles area household to consume potatoes than for Des Moines area household.  
                                                 
26 Although we might test for information order effects, we do not expect them to be significant. In a related 
study with a larger sample size there was not order effects (McFadden and Huffman 2015). 
27 The excluded regressors are whether a child of or over the age of 8 lives in the household, subject’s gender, 
subject is white, exercises weekly, and in good health.   
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Potato Chips 
Regression (3) starts with the same 15 included regressors as for potatoes; largely 
socio-economic variables, and in regression (4) six of the insignificant regressors are 
excluded.28 In regression (4), the most significant factor affecting the probability of a 
subject’s household consuming chips is his or her age.29 The marginal effect of a subject’s 
age on the probability of his or her household consuming chips increases from 18 to 43 years, 
and for subjects older than 43 years, his or her aging reduces the probability of the household 
consuming chips. Female subjects are 9.2 percentage point more likely to have a household 
that consume potato chips than male subjects and adding an additional adult to a subject’s 
household increases the probability of the household consuming potato chips by 5.3 
percentage points.  If the subject reported he or she exercised regularly then the probability of 
his or her household consuming chips is 17.7 percentage points more likely to consume chips 
than the household where the subject reported not exercising regularly.  Boston and Los 
Angeles households are 24.4 and 17.0 percentage points more likely to consume chips than 
Des Moines area households.  
French Fries 
Regression (5) starts with the same set of 15 included regressors as for potatoes; 
largely socio-economic variables, and in regression (6) six of the insignificant regressors are 
excluded.30 In the latter regression, an additional $1,000 in a subject’s household income 
                                                 
28 These regressors are whether a child of or over the age of 8 lives in the household, anyone in household is on 
a diet, subject’s education, subject is married, white, and is in good health.  
29 Additional household income has no economic effect on the probability of a subject’s household consuming 
chips. 
30 These regressors are whether a child of or over the age of 8 lives in the household, anyone in household is on 
a diet, subject’s education, subject is married, white, and is in good health. 
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reduces slightly the probability of his or her household consuming fries (but effects are not 
statistically significant). An additional adult in the subject’s household increases the 
probability of the household consuming fries by 14 percentage points. The probability of a 
household consuming fries increases as the subject’s age increases from 18 years of age to 46 
years of age and then declines as subject’s age increases further.  When the subject is a 
woman the probability that the household consumes fries is 14 percentage points more likely 
than if the subject is a man.  Also, if the subject reported exercising regularly then the 
household was 33 percentage points less likely to consume fries than when the subject 
reported not exercising regularly.  Boston and Los Angeles area households are 34.3 and 29.6 
percentage points more likely to consume fries that Des Moines area households.   
 Across the three potato products, major differences exist in how the regressors affect 
the probability of a household consuming fresh potatoes vs processed potato products (chips 
and fries). A subject’s marital status and whether someone in the household is on a diet are 
important variables for explaining fresh potato consumption but not chip or fry consumption. 
Since people who consider themselves on a diet are usually more conscious about the foods 
they eat as well as the food everyone else in the household eats, it is surprising that “diet” is 
not an important explanatory variable for chips and fries.  In contrast, a subject reporting 
exercising regularly is quite important for explaining consumption of chips and fries but not 
fresh potatoes. A subject’s household income has no significant effect on the probability of 
his or her household consuming potato products. In addition, our empirical model of the 
probability of a subject’s household consuming potato products has the highest explanatory 
power for fresh potatoes, pseudo R2 = 0.285, but is significantly lower for processed 
potatoes—fries and chips, pseudo R2 of 0.195 and 0.169, respectively. 
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Regression analysis of WTP differences 
Results from fitting equation (6) for the two commodities (a 5 lbs. bag of fresh 
potatoes and a 12 oz. bag of fresh potato dices) are reported. For a given commodity, within-
subject WTP differences are expressed both within-variety and across-variety.   
Fresh Potatoes 
In regressions (1) and (2) in table 5, the variety of fresh potatoes is “biotech,” i.e., the 
food label on the front of the package displayed the phrase “Potatoes Grown With Seed 
Improved By Biotechnology.” Subjects bid twice on the biotech potatoes; first without 
information and then a second time after receiving an information treatment. The dependent 
variable is a subject’s WTP for biotech potatoes before information less WTP for biotech 
potatoes after receiving an information treatment.  Hence, the estimated coefficients on 
regressors reflect how a variable impacts the way treatment information changes WTP 
behavior of subjects.31 In our regressions, the dummy variable for a household being located 
in the Des Moines area is excluded and its effect is part of the intercept term.32 
In regression (1) of Table 3.5, there are 15 included regressors, largely socio-economic 
variables, information treatment effects and city dummy variables, and in regression (2), five 
of the insignificant regressors are excluded.33 For regression (2), an increase of $1,000 in a 
                                                 
31 One information treatment must be assigned to the intercept term to provide identification of the effects of the 
other treatment effects relative to the excluded one. Hence, in our results the intercept term absorbs the negative 
effect of the “environmental group perspective.” This arrangement provides results that are the easiest for the 
reader to interpret. 
32 There was no significant order effect, i.e., whether a subject first bid on biotech or conventional products. 
33 The excluded regressors are the number of children less than 8 years of age in the subject’s household; 
subject’s age and education; whether the subject is informed about acrylamide; and an indicator for a subject’s 
household consuming potatoes weekly. The null hypothesis that these 5 coefficients on the excluded variables 
are jointly zero yields a sample value of the F statistic of 0.001, but the tabled critical value of the F with 5 and 
86 degrees of freedom at the 5% significance level is 2.33. Hence, we cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 
5% significance level. 
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subject’s household income reduces subject’s WTP for a 5 lb. bag of biotech potatoes post-
information treatment relative to their pre-information treatment by 0.00006, which is very 
small.  Male subjects have a $0.62 per bag lower WTP for biotech potatoes post-information 
treatment relative to pre-information treatment; or women have larger WTP post-
information. If a subject reported being informed about biotechnology pre-experiment, he or 
she had a $0.74 per bag higher WTP for biotech potatoes post-information treatment than 
pre-information treatment. If a subject indicated in the pre-auction survey that he or she reads 
food labels when buying new foods for the first time or views biotech and GM foods as being 
different, his or her WTP for a bag of biotech potatoes post-information treatment is $0.75 
lower than for the pre-information treatment WTP.  However, if the subject receives the 
“company perspective” information treatment, his or her WTP for a bag of biotech potatoes 
is $1.43 higher post-information treatment than pre-information treatment. Hence, the 
“company perspective” is influential in modifying subject’s WTP for improved food safety 
using biotechnology. If a subject received the third information treatment (the company 
perspective and the environmental group perspective), his or her WTP for a bag of biotech 
potatoes was $0.85 higher post-information treatment than pre-information treatment. Hence, 
the positive “company perspective” continues to weigh heavily on WTP differences relative 
to the negative environmental group perspective. Subjects from the Los Angeles area are 
willing to pay $0.65 more per bag of biotech potatoes post-information than pre-information 
treatment relative to Des Moines area subjects. There was no difference in WTP for a bag of 
biotech potatoes post- vs pre-information treatment for Boston area subjects than Iowa 
subjects. Hence, Los Angeles subjects were most favorably impacted by the company 
information treatment. 
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Regressions (3) and (4) of Table 3.5 present a different perspective on WTP for 
biotech potatoes. It is a comparison of WTP for a 5 lb. bag of biotech potatoes post-
information treatment with WTP for a 5 lb. bag of conventional potatoes pre-information 
treatment—a type of comparison that a consumer might face in a marketing campaign for 
new biotech potatoes appearing in grocery stores and super markets. Hence, both the variety 
type and information treatments are different in this comparison, and it is similar to the 
framing of WTP differences in the econometric analysis presented by Rousu et al. (2007). 
Regression (3) contains the same set of regressors as regression (1). The regressors that are 
much less significant in regression (3) than (1) are a subject’s household income, whether a 
subject reads food labels and whether a subject resides in the Los Angeles area. In regression 
(4) six regressors having small z-values are excluded.34 For the remaining estimated 
coefficients, it is surprising that all of them are 30-50% smaller than for regression (2), 
except for the coefficient of the Boston area dummy variable, which is not significantly 
different from zero in both regressions.  
Fresh Potato Dices 
In regressions (1) and (2) in Table 3.6, the variety of fresh potato dices is “biotech,” 
i.e., the food label on the front of the package displayed the phrase “Potatoes Grown With 
Seed Improved By Biotechnology.” Subjects bid twice on the biotech dices; first before 
receiving the information treatment and then a second time after receiving an information 
                                                 
34 The excluded regressors are the number of children less than 8 years of age in the subject’s household; 
subject’s age and education; whether subject was informed about acrylamide; whether subject reads food labels 
on new goods; and an indicator for a subject’s household consuming fresh potatoes weekly. The null hypothesis 
that the estimated coefficients on these 6 regressors are jointly equal to zero yields a sample value of the F 
statistic of 0.34, but the tabled critical value of the F with 6 and 87 degrees of freedom at the 5% significance 
level is 2.20. Hence, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no joint effects at the 5% significance level. 
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treatment. The dependent variable is a subject’s WTP for a 12 oz bag of biotech dices before 
information less WTP for biotech dices after receiving an information treatment.  
In regression (1), there are 15 included regressors, largely socio-economic variables, 
information treatment effects and city dummy variables, and in regression (2), eight of the 
insignificant regressors are excluded.35 In regression (2), if the subject indicated that he or 
she reads food labels then his or her WTP post-information treatment declines by $0.43 per 
bag relative to the pre-information treatment WTP.   Similarly, if the subject considers 
biotech and GM foods as being different, a subtle dimension, then his or her WTP is $0.44 
less per bag post information than pre-information treatment.  If the subject received the 
“company perspective” information treatments, his or her WTP for a bag of dices increases 
by $0.88 relative to his or her WTP pre-information treatment.  Like previously stated, this is 
not surprising since the “company perspective” provides positive information about 
biotechnology and biotech foods.  If the subject receives the “company perspective” and 
“environmental group perspective” in the information treatment, his or her WTP for a bag of 
dices increases by $0.38 relative to his or her WTP pre-information treatment. This is a 
decline of $0.50 per bag compared to just the “company perspective”, and shows that the 
“environmental group perspective,” where packaged with the “company perspective” only 
slightly reduces the positive effect of the “company perspective” only treatment on WTP for 
                                                 
35 The excluded regressors are a subject’s household income; the number of children less than 8 years of age in 
subject’s household; subject’s gender, age, and education; whether  subject was informed about acrylamide; 
whether subject was informed about biotechnology; and an indicator for a subject’s household consuming 
potatoes weekly. The null hypothesis that the coefficients of these 8 coefficients variables are jointly zero yields 
a sample value of the F statistic of 0.43, but the tabled critical value of the F with 8 and 87 degrees of freedom 
at the 5% significance level is 2.05. Hence, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no joint effects at the 5% 
significance level. 
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biotech dices.  Hence, the environmental group perspective does little to moderate the effects 
of the company perspective. 
Regressions (3) and (4) in table 6 present a different perspective on WTP for fresh cut 
potato dices. The dependent variable in these regressions is a subject’s WTP for fresh-cut 
potato dices made from “Potatoes Grown with Seed Improved by Biotechnology” post-
information treatment relative to his or her WTP for a 12 oz bag of fresh cut potato dices 
made using “sodium bisulfite” (a preservative to reduce discoloration).  Hence, the “variety” 
of the commodity (dices) and available information are different in computing the WTP 
differences—fresh biotech dices without sulfites vs non-biotech dices with sodium bisulfite 
added. Regression (3) contains the same 15 regressors as for regression (1). A regressor that 
is more significant in (3) than (1) is the effect of a subject indicating in the pre-auction 
survey that he or she reads food labels when buying a food item for the first time. A regressor 
that is less significant in (3) than (1) is the effect of a subject reporting in the pre-auction 
survey that biotech and GM foods are different. In regression (4), when a subject reports in 
the pre-auction survey that he or she is informed about biotechnology, his or her WTP for a 
bag of dices is $0.29 higher post-information treatment relative to pre-information treatment. 
When a subject indicates that he or she reads food labels, his or her WTP for a bag of biotech 
dices declines by $0.41 post-information treatment relative to a bag of dices containing 
sodium bisulfite per-information treatment. If a subject receives the “company perspective,” 
he or she is willing to pay $0.82 more for a bag of biotech dices post-information treatment 
than for a bag of dices containing sodium bisulfite pre-information treatment. If a subject 
receives the “company perspective” and “environmental group perspective” information 
treatment, their WTP is $0.61 higher for a bag of biotech dices post-information than for a 
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bag of sodium bisulfide dices pre-information treatment. Hence, the WTP difference per bag 
is only reduced by $0.20 when the “environmental group perspective” is added to the 
“company perspective.” This is similar to the findings for fresh potatoes. Although subjects 
from the Boston area tend to pay less and for Los Angeles area to pay more for a bag of 
biotech dices relative to Des Moines residents, these city effects are not significantly 
different from zero at the 5 percent level.  
 The information treatment effects on WTP differences for fresh potatoes and dices are 
consistent with the information treatment effects obtained by Rousu et al. (2007) and Colson 
et al. (2011) for biotech foods. The explanatory power of the empirical models of WTP 
differences is largest for the comparisons of within-variety differences; R2 being 0.312 for 
biotech potatoes and 0.256 for biotech dices. We lose about 0.10 from the R2 in the 
comparisons of WTP for biotech product post-information treatment relative to conventional 
product pre-information. This suggests that there is additional unexplained noise in the cross-
variety comparisons that does not exist in the within-variety comparisons. 
Conclusion 
This study provides new empirical evidence on household demand for traditional 
fresh potato and processed potato products and consumers’ willingness to pay for a new 
variety of fresh biotech potato and a new potato product—fresh potato dices; products with 
low-acrylamide, and fresh dices that are also sulfite-free. The probability of a subject’s 
household consuming traditional fresh potatoes, chips and fries is not significantly related to 
their household income. Hence, the results suggest that the demand for potatoes in the U.S. 
will not change much as real household incomes rise over time. However, aging of the adult 
population is expected to decrease the probability of households consuming chips but not 
potatoes or fries. The probability of a household consuming potato products is unaffected by 
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a subject’s education. It is perhaps surprising that households in the Boston and Los Angeles 
areas were significantly more likely to consume processed potato products than households 
in the Des Moines area.  
We find empirical evidence that some participants are willing to pay for food 
safety—fresh Russet potatoes having low potential to produce acrylamide and white potato 
dices that also are sulfite free—all achieved using biotechnology, but not transgenic GMOs.  
However, WTP is conditioned by the information injected into the experimental auction. 
Retailers could segment their consumers into those that are receptive to GMOs and distribute 
information to them that is packaged to show the benefits of low-acrylamide potato products. 
In this way, they can increase the demand for these products. Retailers can retain consumers 
who have non-GMO preferences by carrying both GMO and non-GMO varieties of potato 
products. In the long run, biotech potato products that have improved food safety are 
expected to achieve higher rates of consumer acceptance in the U.S. than those with earlier 
traits for herbicide tolerance and/or insect resistance. 
Limitations to our study include small sample size and under representation of rural 
subjects and households.  However, none of our preliminary results showed that subjects 
from rural households responded differently from subjects in urban households. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 3.1 Steps in the Experiments 
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Figure 3.2 Product Labels 
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Figure 3.3 Company Perspective 
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Figure 3.4 Environmental Perspective 
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Table 3.1 Sample Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Potato Consumption Weekly (=1) 0.931 0.254 
Potato Chip Consumption Weekly (=1) 0.824 0.383 
French Fry Consumption Weekly (=1) 0.598 0.493 
Household Income ($1,000) 72.30 47.04 
Number of Adults 2.19 1.07 
Number of Children < 8yrs 0.196 0.508 
Number of Children ≥ 8yrs 0.559 0.874 
Rural (=1) 0.059 0.237 
Anyone on Diet (=1) 0.353 0.480 
Gender (1=Male) 0.392 0.491 
Age 43.32 13.13 
Education (yrs.) 14.38 2.00 
Married (=1) 0.510 0.502 
White (=1) 0.873 0.335 
Reads Food Label (=1)a/ 0.882 0.324 
Exercises Weekly (=1) 0.931 0.254 
Good Health (=1)b/ 0.794 0.406 
Smokes Cigarettes (=1) 0.088 0.285 
Blue Collar Occupation (=1)c/ 0.128 0.335 
Boston (=1) 0.314 0.466 
Los Angeles (=1) 0.333 0.474 
a/   A 1 if responded “Some of the time,” “Often,” or “Always” reads food labels when buying a food product 
for the first time and 0 otherwise. 
b/   A 1 if respondent is in good or excellent physical health and 0 otherwise.  
c/   A 1 if respondent is in an occupation of “building and grounds cleaning and maintenance,” 
“construction/installation/repair,” “farming/fishing/forestry,” “production /manufacturing,” or 
“transportation” and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3.2 Bid (WTP) Summary Statistics for Participants 
Commodity N Mean Bid 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
A.  All Bids: Pre-Information 
Conventional Potatoes 102 2.71 1.43 0.01 6.75 
Conventional Potato Dices 102 1.82 1.26 0 6 
Biotech Potatoes 102 2.87 1.52 0 6.95 
Biotech Potato Dices 102 2.13 1.34 0 5.95 
B.  All Bids: Post Information 
Conventional Potatoes 102 2.69 1.45 0.01 6 
Conventional Potato Dices 102 1.77 1.36 0 6.99 
Biotech Potatoes 102 2.50 1.84 0 7.95 
Biotech Potato Dices 102 1.78 1.31 0 6 
A1.  Bids Pre-Information: Before B1 
Conventional Potatoes 36 2.84 1.53 0.25 6.75 
Conventional Potato Dices 36 1.94 1.12 0.1 4.89 
Biotech Potatoes 36 2.92 1.60 0 6 
Biotech Potato Dices 36 2.17 1.12 0 4.5 
B1.  Bids Post-Information: Company Perspective Only 
Conventional Potatoes 36 2.93 1.57 0.3 5.99 
Conventional Potato Dices 36 1.98 1.14 0.1 5 
Biotech Potatoes 36 3.11 1.77 0.01 7 
Biotech Potato Dices 36 2.21 1.25 0.01 6 
A2.  Bids Pre-Information: Before B2 
Conventional Potatoes 34 2.75 1.29 0.89 6 
Conventional Potato Dices 34 1.99 1.43 0.25 6 
Biotech Potatoes 34 2.95 1.40 0.99 6 
Biotech Potato Dices 34 2.19 1.42 0.49 5.95 
B2.  Bids Post-Information: Environmental Perspective Only 
Conventional Potatoes 34 2.73 1.29 0.75 6 
Conventional Potato Dices 34 1.77 1.39 0 5.65 
Biotech Potatoes 34 1.89 1.77 0 7 
Biotech Potato Dices 34 1.46 1.29 0 5 
A3.  Binds Pre-Information: Before B3 
Conventional Potatoes 34 2.51 1.49 0.01 5.99 
Conventional Potato Dices 34 1.51 1.19 0 4.25 
Biotech Potatoes 34 2.74 1.59 0.01 6.95 
Biotech Potato Dices 34 2.03 1.49 0 4.99 
B3.  Bids Post-Information: Company and Environmental Perspectives 
Conventional Potatoes 34 2.37 1.46 0.01 5.99 
Conventional Potato Dices 34 1.56 1.54 0 6.99 
Biotech Potatoes 34 2.45 1.82 0 7.95 
Biotech Potato Dices 34 1.63 1.31 0 4.65 
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Table 3.3 WTP Differences and Other Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean 
Standard                   
Deviation 
WTP for improved biotechnology potatoes after  
         information treatment less WTP for      
         improved biotechnology potatoes before  
         information treatment ($) 
-0.38 
 
$1.49 
WTP for improved biotechnology potatoes after  
         information treatment less WTP for  
         conventional potatoes before information  
         treatment ($) 
-0.21 1.40 
WTP for improved biotechnology dices after  
         information treatment less WTP for  
         improved biotechnology dices before  
         information treatment ($) 
-0.36 1.05 
WTP for improved biotechnology dices after  
         information treatment less WTP for  
         conventional dices with sodium bisulfide  
         before information treatment ($) 
-0.05 
 
0.98 
Pre-auction, subject informed about: acrylamide 
                                                           biotechnology 
0.059 
0.382 
0.236 
0.488 
Subject received information treatment: 
       Environmental group perspective 
       Company perspective                    
       Company & environmental group perspectives 
 
0.333 
0.353 
0.314 
 
0.474 
0.480 
0.466 
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Table 3.4 Probit: Probability of Household Consuming Commodities Weeklya/ 
 Potatoes Potato Chips French Fries 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Household income ($1,000) -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
 (1.59) (1.68) (0.03) (1.07) (0.95) (1.35) 
 [-0.0000] [-0.0000] [0.0000] [-0.000] [-0.000] [-0.000] 
Number of Adults 0.901 0.610 0.247 0.256 0.382 0.371 
 (1.65) (1.61) (1.12) (1.33) (1.86) (2.00) 
 [0.017] [0.030] [0.047] [0.053] [0.144] [0.140] 
Number of Children ≥ 8yrs 0.618 ‒ -0.227 ‒ 0.034 ‒ 
 (0.92)  (1.04)  (0.19)  
 [0.011]  [-0.043]  [0.013]  
Anyone on diet (=1) -0.841 -0.474 -0.047 ‒ -0.235 ‒ 
 (1.13) (0.94) (0.12)  (0.73)  
 [-0.024] [-0.028] [-0.009]  [-0.090]  
Gender (1=male) -0.690 -0.706 -0.463 -0.420 0.731 0.699 
 (1.14) (1.40) (1.31) (1.23) (2.33) (2.33) 
 [-0.017] [-0.043] [-0.094] [-0.092] [0.264] [0.253] 
Age 0.333 0.209 0.426 0.332 0.134 0.148 
 (1.32) (1.29) (3.06) (3.09) (1.27) (1.65) 
 [0.006] [0.010] [0.081] [0.069] [0.051] [0.056] 
Age2 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 (1.37) (1.40) (3.03) (3.02) (1.30) (1.66) 
 [-0.0001] [-0.0001] [-0.001] [-0.001] [-0.001] [-0.001] 
Education (yrs.) -0.012 ‒ -0.146 ‒ 0.003 ‒ 
 (0.07)  (1.38)  (0.03)  
 [-0.0002]  [-0.028]  [0.001]  
Married (=1) 1.030 0.928 -0.198 ‒ -0.124 ‒ 
 (1.34) (1.40) (0.49)  (0.34)  
 [0.024] [0.052] [-0.038]  [-0.047]  
White (=1) 0.755 ‒ -0.555 ‒ -0.067 ‒ 
 (0.76)  (0.84)  (0.14)  
 [0.029]  [-0.082]  [-0.025]  
Exercises Weekly (=1) 1.155 ‒ -0.829 0.668 -0.971 -1.102 
 (1.12)  (1.57) (1.38) (1.81) (2.15) 
 [0.065]  [0.217] [0.177] [-0.301] [-0.329] 
Good Health (=1) 0.791 ‒ 0.088 ‒ -0.389 ‒ 
 (0.88)  (0.17)  (0.95)  
 [0.028]  [0.017]  [-0.140]  
Boston (=1) 0.779 0.728 1.11 1.12 1.019 1.003 
 (0.86) (0.97) (2.07) (2.27) (2.43) (2.58) 
 [0.011] [0.029] [0.169] [0.186] [0.345] [0.340] 
Los Angeles (=1) 0.751 0.701 0.756 0.830 1.047 1.020 
 (0.97) (1.03) (1.75) (2.04) (2.60) (2.77) 
 [0.011] [0.029] [0.125] [0.148] [0.356] [0.348] 
Intercept -7.587 -2.937 -6.583 -7.052 -2.525 -3.030 
 (1.09) (0.77) (2.02) (2.76) (0.97) (1.39) 
Pseudo R2 0.348 0.285 0.212 0.169 0.210 0.195 
a/Absolute value of z-values in parentheses. t-values larger than 1.98 are significantly different from zero at the 
5% level; larger than 1.65 are significant at 10% level. The marginal effects are in square brackets. 
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Table 3.5 Regression Analysis of WTP differences: WTP After Information 
Treatment Less WTP before Treatment - Fresh Potatoes, 5lbs (n=102)a/ 
 
Biotech Potatoes 
Biotech Potatoes vs. 
Conventional Potatoes 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Household income ($1,000) -0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00004 -0.00003 
 (1.69) (1.73) (1.06) (1.16) 
Number of Children < 8yrs -0.042 ‒ -0.164 ‒ 
 (0.15)  (0.58)  
Gender (1=male) -0.636 -0.621 -0.486 -0.461 
 (2.32) (2.34) (1.79) (1.75) 
Age -0.002 ‒ 0.003 ‒ 
 (0.22)  (0.32)  
Education (yrs.) 0.018 ‒ -0.002 ‒ 
 (0.23)  (0.02)  
Informed about acrylamide (=1) -0.192 ‒ 0.498 ‒ 
 (0.32)  (0.82)  
Informed about biotechnology (=1) 0.782 0.738 0.584 0.583 
 (2.64) (2.67) (2.00) (2.18) 
Reads food label (=1) -0.774 -0.748 -0.398 ‒ 
 (1.77) (1.78) (0.92)  
Biotech and GM foods are different 
(=1) 
-0.727 
(2.56) 
-0.732 
(2.72) 
-0.536 
(1.91) 
-0.493 
(1.85) 
Company perspective 
 
1.424 
(4.34) 
1.423 
(4.51) 
1.249 
(3.84) 
1.200 
(3.86) 
Company perspective × 
Environmental group perspective 
0.808 
(2.36) 
0.845 
(2.61) 
0.874 
(2.59) 
0.898 
(2.82) 
Household consumes potatoes weekly -0.358 ‒ -0.243 ‒ 
 (0.65)  (0.45)  
Boston (=1) 0.143 0.144 -0.99 -0.093 
 (0.38) (0.42) (0.27) (0.27) 
Los Angeles (=1) 0.684 0.654 0.241 0.215 
 (1.93) (2.01) (0.69) (0.67) 
Intercept 0.164 -0.090 0.058 -0.532 
 (0.11) (0.18) (0.04) (1.55) 
𝑅2  0.318 0.312 0.241 0.223 
a/ Absolute value of t-values in parentheses. Coefficients with t-values larger than 1.98 are significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level; larger than 1.65 are significant at 10% level. Environmental group 
perspective on biotechnology is the excluded information treatment. 
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Table 3.6 Regression Analysis of Willingness-to-Pay Differences: WTP After 
information Treatment less WTP Before Treatment - Fresh Cut Potato Dices, 12oz 
(n=102)a/ 
                          Low Acrylamide 
Biotech Dices 
Low Acrylamide Biotech 
Dices vs. Dices w Sodium 
Bisulfite 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Household income ($1,000) -0.00001 ‒ -0.00001 ‒ 
 (0.56)  (0.53)  
Number of Children < 8yrs 0.116 ‒ -0.112 ‒ 
 (0.56)  (0.55)  
Gender (1=male) -0.074 ‒ -0.017 ‒ 
 (0.37)  (0.09)  
Age 0.008 ‒ 0.003 ‒ 
 (0.98)  (0.33)  
Education (yrs.) 0.018 ‒ 0.023 ‒ 
 (0.32)  (0.42)  
Informed about acrylamide (=1) -0.310 ‒ -0.017 ‒ 
 (0.70)  (0.04)  
Informed about biotechnology (=1) 0.261 ‒ 0.279 0.291 
 (1.23)  (1.32) (1.51) 
Reads food label (=1)    -0.550 -0.432 -0.400 -0.413 
 (1.75) (1.46) (1.28) (1.39) 
Biotech and GM foods are different 
(=1) 
-0.475 
(2.33) 
-0.441 
(2.29) 
-0.107 
(0.52) 
‒ 
Company perspective         
 
0.863 
(3.65) 
0.876 
(3.89) 
0.830 
(3.53) 
0.816 
(3.70) 
Company perspective × 
 Environmental group perspective 
0.341 
(1.38) 
0.376 
(1.61) 
0.613 
(2.51) 
0.614 
(2.70) 
Household consumes potatoes weekly -0.033 ‒ 0.180 ‒ 
 (0.08)  (0.46)  
Boston (=1) -0.428 -0.522 -0.233 -0.299 
 (1.58) (2.29) (0.87) (1.34) 
Los Angeles (=1) 0.417 0.365 0.244 0.148 
 (1.63) (1.60) (0.96) (0.67) 
Intercept -0.614 -0.169 -0.729 -0.229 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.70) (0.70) 
R2 0.287 0.256 0.199 0.187 
a/ Absolute value of t-values in parentheses. Coefficients with t-values larger than 1.98 are significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level; larger than 1.65 are significant at 10% level. Environmental group 
perspective on biotechnology is the excluded information treatment. 
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CHAPTER 4.    THE SIMULTANEOUS ADOPTION OF RESISTANCE 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES TO CONTROL WEEDS 
Introduction 
Over the past 70 years pesticides have contributed to substantial yield increases by 
controlling weeds, diseases, and insects that damage crops.  Due to the ease of application, 
pesticides have substituted for labor, machinery, and fuel use in pest control. As a result, 
farmers saw an increase in net returns making pesticides more attractive.  However, as weeds 
and other pests become resistant to pesticides, the chemicals become less effective causing 
farmers to use more and more chemicals to kill the pests. 
Glyphosate, a broad-spectrum herbicide, was released for commercial use in 1974. 
Due to its very low toxicity to mammals, birds, and fish, glyphosate became an attractive 
herbicide to farmers. Additionally, it was believed that due to glyphosate’s mode of action 
and the lack of metabolism in plants, plants could not become resistant to glyphosate 
(Shaner, 2000; Bonny, 2016). Until 1996, glyphosate was restricted to use prior to crop 
seeding for weed control (Duke and Powles, 2009) and was generally used along with other 
chemicals or other weed control mechanisms.  Since glyphosate is a non-selective herbicide, 
it could control almost all weed species and was very effective as a pre-emergence herbicide. 
Due to these use limitations, during the first 26 years of availability there was little evolution 
of glyphosate resistance weeds (Duke and Powles, 2009).  As can be seen in Figure 4.1 there 
were only 2 glyphosate resistant weed species in the US in 2000 (Heap, 2016).  
In 1996, the first genetically modified soybean, corn and cotton plants became 
commercially available.  These GM crops are herbicide tolerant (HT) and/or insect resistant 
(IR) crops. The herbicide tolerant crops are modified such that the crops will have limited 
damage from direct pesticide applications.  The most common and popular HT trait is the 
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glyphosate tolerant (GT) trait, which was released in 1996.  The insect resistant crops are 
modified in a way that prevents insects from harming crops (Frisvold & Reeves, 2011).  
Specifically, IR, also known as Bt crops, contains a gene, Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), which 
is a soil dwelling bacterium that produces a protein toxic to insects (Fernandez-Cornejo el al, 
2014). 
When GT crops were released, Monsanto recommended only using glyphosate when 
using GT crops.  In soybeans specifically, Monsanto recommended that farmers use 
glyphosate as a pre-emergence herbicide and then follow up with one or two more glyphosate 
applications (Shaner, 2000).  These beliefs and recommendations may have led to the rapid 
rise in glyphosate application rates in recent years and may have impacted the development 
of glyphosate resistance in weed species (Fernandez-Cornejo et al, 2014).  As can be seen in 
Figure 4.1, the number of glyphosate resistant weed species in the US rapidly increased from 
2003 until 2010 with 13 glyphosate resistant weed species.  From 2010 until 2015, the 
growth rate of glyphosate resistant weed species slowed with the development of only 2 new 
resistant weed species. As of 2015 there are 15 glyphosate resistant weed species in the US 
(Heap, 2016). 
As the weed resistance to herbicides grows, farmers must adopt different technologies 
to kill or prevent the weed growth on their farms. The objective of this study is to assess 
farmers’ adoption of 4 weed resistance management practice (RMP) groups, using Iowa 
Farm and Rural Life Poll data. Additionally, we to evaluate the complementarity of RMP 
groups (e.g., which groups are more likely to be used together than not used together), which 
has not been done previously. 
 
81 
 
Previous Research 
Following Griliches (1957) study on adoption rates of hybrid seed corn, a vast 
literature studying technology adoption in agriculture emerged.  Research into the adoption 
of resistance management practices (RMPs) was sparser until recently, and a majority of the 
RMP adoption research was from a weed science approach.  Two major branches for 
explaining adoption decisions can be found in the literature: the economics constraint and 
innovation-diffusion theories (Adesina & Zinnah, 1993).  Economic constraint models assert 
that constraints such as, liquidity, land/farm size, and risk attitudes are the major 
determinants of observed technology adoption behavior (Dorfman, 1996; Havens and Flinn, 
1976; Mauceri et al, 2004). While innovation-diffusion models, which began with the work 
of Ryan and Gross (1943) followed by Rogers (1962), assert that access to information about 
the new technology is the key factor to determining adoption (Adesina & Zinnah, 1993; 
Truong Thi, 2008; DeDecker et al, 2014; Borkhani et al, 2010).  
 Most like our study, Frisvold et al. (2009) examined the adoption of 10 different 
RMPs used to control weed resistance to herbicides.  The authors found that farmers who 
used a greater number of RMPs often had more education but less farming experience 
(younger in age).  They also expected higher yields relative to the county average.  Frisvold 
and others also found that yield expectations and variability were significant predictors of 
adoption of individual RMPs.  Out of the 10 RMPs analyzed cleaning equipment, using 
multiple herbicides with different modes of action, and supplemental tillage were the least 
used RMPs.  
 In a different approach from other weed RMP studies, which maximizes farmer’s net 
present value, we assume farmer’s make cost minimizing decisions and therefore maximize 
their utility of profit. 
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Conceptual Framework 
Suppose that farms have access to 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝐽 technologies that aim to accomplish a similar 
function such as pest eradication, 𝑇1, 𝑇2, … , 𝑇𝐽.  Technologies can be used independently or in 
combination with one another.  The production function is given by 𝐹(𝑇1, 𝑇2, … , 𝑇𝐽, 𝑍; Ω) 
where Z is a composite input reflecting labor, capital, and other factors employed on the 
farm, and Ω reflects exogenous environmental and geoclimatic factors that raise or lower 
farm productivity.  Each technology can be used at varying intensities subject to positive but 
diminishing marginal products so that 
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝑇𝑗
> 0 and 
𝜕2𝐹
𝜕𝑇𝑗
2 < 0.  Each farm i has a target output 
level ?̅?𝑖.  Its objective is to minimize the cost of production  
min 𝐶𝑖 = 𝑃1𝑇1 + 𝑃2𝑇2 + ⋯ + 𝑃𝐽𝑇𝐽 + 𝑃𝑍𝑍 + 𝜇 (?̅?𝑖 − 𝐹(𝑇1, 𝑇2, … , 𝑇𝐽, 𝑍𝑖 ,  Ω𝑖)) 
(4.1) 
The first-order conditions are  
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝜕𝑇1
= 𝑃1 −  𝜇𝐹𝑇1 ≥ 0 
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝜕𝑇2
= 𝑃2 −  𝜇𝐹𝑇2 ≥ 0 
⋮ 
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝜕𝑇𝐽
= 𝑃𝐽 −  𝜇𝐹𝑇𝐽 ≥ 0 
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝜕𝑍
= 𝑃𝑍 −  𝜇𝐹𝑇𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝜕𝜇
= ?̅?𝑖 − 𝐹(𝑇1, 𝑇2, … , 𝑇𝐽, 𝑍𝑖,  Ω𝑖) = 0 
 
(4.2A) 
 
 
(4.2B) 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.2C) 
 
 
(4.2D) 
 
 
(4.2E) 
If a technology is used, its intensity will be such that the marginal cost is lower than for other 
technologies for at least some range of use, meaning that  
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𝑃𝑗
𝐹𝑇𝑗
≤
𝑃𝑙
𝐹𝑇𝑙
 ∇𝑙 ≠ 𝑗 
(4.3) 
With rising marginal cost of intensity of use, it is possible that a technology is 
adopted up to some level of intensity after which a second technology satisfies condition 
(4.3).  This is illustrated in Figure 4.2.  In this case, at Q=0, the first technology has the 
lowest marginal cost.  As the application of the technology increases with output, the 
marginal cost is rising.  Eventually, the marginal cost of an additional increase in intensity of 
use of the first technology rises above the marginal cost of using the second technology.  
Moreover, the slope of the marginal cost curve for the second technology will be less than 
that of the first due to the diminishing marginal productivity condition.  As a result, there will 
be a range of output where the farmer is using both the first and second technology, but 
again, diminishing marginal productivity will eventually make a third technology 
economically viable.  The implication is that large farms or farms with intense use of 
technologies will be more likely to use multiple technologies rather than a single one. 
Assuming equality conditions hold, the reduced-form equation for technology j will be  
𝑇𝑖𝑗 =  𝑓𝑖(𝑃1, 𝑃2, … , 𝑃𝐽 , 𝑃𝑍, ?̅?𝑖,  Ω𝑖) (4.4) 
In practice, the prices will be identical across farms and so their effect on technology choice 
will be captured as a common effect.  Variation in technology choice will depend on the 
remaining factors, farm size and the exogenous environmental factors. 
Data 
In this study, we use data from the Iowa Farm and Rural Life Poll (IFRLP), 
developed and conducted by Iowa State University Extension Sociology, in partnership with 
the Iowa Department of Agricultural and Land Stewardship and Iowa Agricultural Statistics.   
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The IFRLP is an annual survey of approximately 2,000 Iowa farmers developed to learn how 
the ongoing changes in Iowa’s agriculture and rural areas affect farmers and rural society. 
 The main source of data is from the 2013 IFRLP, which focused on soil health and 
compaction, climate change, rented land, weed and insect management, and farm and farmer 
characteristics. However, this survey was missing information on farmer education, which 
was included in the 2011 and 2015 polls. There were 726 farmers who responded to every 
question used from the 2013 survey and provided their highest earned degree in either 2011 
or 2015.  Therefore, the farmers included in our study had to respond to the survey multiple 
times. 
 In 2013, farmers were given a list of 11 methods for managing herbicide resistant 
weeds on their fields and asked to indicate whether he/she have used each of the methods. 
These eleven RMP methods were selected and recommended to be included in the survey by 
weed scientists at Iowa State University.  The list of RMPs and rate of use by responding 
farmers can be found in Table 4.1. I use two different methods of grouping RMPs and report 
results for both methods. First, I principle component analysis (PCA) to group the RMPs into 
4 technology groups.  The technologies ended up in groups that could be defined based on 
how the technology enhanced the productivity of the factor inputs:  
1. Chemical intensive technologies: Multiple herbicide application timings, multiple 
modes of herbicide action used each season, and multiple modes of action used in 
each herbicide application  
2. Labor intensive technologies: Mechanical weed control (i.e., cultivation), hand-
weeding, and inclusion of forage in the crop rotation, and cover crops   
3. Capital intensive technologies:  Tillage and higher planting rates. 
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4. Biological intensive technologies: Rotation of crops and use of crop cultivars that are 
resistant to herbicides other than glyphosate  
Details on the PCA are presented in the Appendix.  The rate of RMP group use and RMP 
bundles can be found in Table 4.2. The second RMP grouping method I developed by 
speaking with a weed specialist at Iowa State University, who recommended grouping the 
RMPs into three groups.36 There are three technology groups based on a weed science 
classification of resistance management practices: 
1. Cultural intensive: rotation of crops, inclusion of forage in the crop rotation, cover 
crops, and higher planting rates 
2. Chemical intensive technologies: use of crop cultivars that are resistant to herbicides 
other than glyphosate, multiple herbicide application timings, multiple modes of 
herbicide action used each season, and multiple modes of action used in each 
herbicide application 
3. Mechanical intensive technologies: tillage, mechanical weed control (i.e., 
cultivation), and hand-weeding.37 
The rate of RMP group use and RMP bundles can be found in Table 4.3. 
 The sample means are reported in Table 4.4. The ages of our 726 respondents ranged 
from 32 to 93 years old with an average of 64 years of age. Ninety-seven percent are male 
with an average education of 14 years, which is equivalent to an associate’s degree. 
Additionally, 76% of the farmers reported having a spouse in 2013 with an average of 59%  
 
                                                 
36 I would like to thank Dr. Bob Hartzler for his expert advice on weed management. 
37 Hand-weeding is included in mechanical intensive RMPs since it is a mechanism which is physically 
disruptive of weeds similar to cultivation or tilling.  
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of household income coming from the farm operations. Farmers in our sample farm an 
average of 508 acres. 
Methods 
To analyze farmer’s RMP adoption decisions we estimate the utility of profit maximization. 
The farmer’s random utility function to adopt 𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑗  (𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝐽), is represented as 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑄𝑗?̅?𝑖 + 𝛼ΩjΩ𝑖
′ + 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖
′ + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 , (4.5) 
where 𝑈𝑖𝑗 is the utility of the i-th farmer who adopts 𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑗 .  The technology adoption 
decision is affected by farm size and environmental factors.  We also include a vector 𝑋𝑖
′ of 
farm and farmer characteristics that affect preferences.  The random error 𝜀𝑖𝑗 would include 
unobservable factors known by the farmer that affect the utility of using technology j. The 
error terms are assumed to be jointly distributed multivariate normal random variables with 
zero conditional mean and variance normalized to one, 
𝜀 = [𝜀𝑖1   𝜀𝑖2    ⋯    𝜀𝑖𝐽]~𝑀𝑉𝑁(0, Σ) (4.6) 
where Σ is the covariance matrix, 
Σ = [
1 ⋯ 𝜌1𝐽
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝜌1𝐽 ⋯ 1
]. 
(4.7) 
A farmer will adopt an RMP when the utility is larger for adopting that RMP 
compared to the utility from all other RMPs.  Thus, we will denote 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 1 as the farmer’s 
choice to adopt 𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑗 , implying that 𝑈𝑖𝑗 > 𝑈𝑖𝑙 for all 𝑗 ≠ 𝑙 = 1, 2, … , 𝐽. Let 𝑊𝑖 represent all 
the factors included in (5) that influence farmer i’s decision regarding technology j with 
associated coefficients 𝜃𝑗 .  Following Maddala (1983), the probability that 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 1 can be 
represented as,  
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝑊𝑖
′𝜃𝑗 , Σ) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈𝑖𝑙 < 𝑈𝑖𝑗, ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑙 = 1, 2, … 𝐽)   
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜀𝑖𝑙 − 𝜀𝑖𝑗 < 𝑊𝑖
′𝜃𝑗 − 𝑊𝑖
′𝜃𝚤, ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑙 = 1, 2, … 𝐽) 
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜂𝑙𝑗 < 𝑊𝑖
′(𝜃𝑗 − 𝜃𝑙), ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑙 = 1, 2, … 𝐽) 
= Φ(𝑊𝑖
′(𝜃𝑗 − 𝜃𝑙), Σ)  
(4.8) 
 
where 𝑛𝑙𝑗 = 𝜀𝑖𝑙 − 𝜀𝑖𝑗 for all 𝑗 ≠ 𝑙 = 1, 2, … , 𝐽 and Φ(∙) is the multivariate normal 
distribution function. 
Prob(𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝑊𝑖
′𝜃𝑗 , Σ) = ∫ ⋯ ∫ 𝑓(𝜂1𝑗 , … , 𝜂𝐽𝑗)𝑑𝜂1𝑗 , … 𝑑𝜂𝐽𝑗
𝑊𝑖
′(𝜃𝑗−𝜃𝐽)
−∞
𝑊𝑖
′(𝜃𝑗−𝜃1)
−∞
. 
(4.9) 
where 𝑓(𝜂1𝑗 , 𝜂2𝑗 , … , 𝜂𝐽𝑗) has a multivariate normal distribution.   
The farmer characteristics include age, years of education, whether the farmer has a 
spouse, gender, total acres farmed, and percent of household income from the farm operation. 
Typically, younger farmers are less risk-averse and more likely to try new technologies 
(Adesina and Zinnah, 1993; Mauceri et al, 2005). However, older farmers are less subject to 
credit constraints. Further, Sharma and others (2011) find that younger farmers are more 
likely to adopt multiple pest management practices compared to older farmers. Overall, we 
would expect to see a negative correlation with age and more advanced technologies, such as 
labor-intensive technologies. 
Farmers who have completed more years of formal education are more likely to 
understand information concerning new technologies and the benefits of early adoption 
(Mauceri et al, 2005; Fernandez-Cornejo & McBride, 2002). Fernandez-Cornejo and others 
(2001) found education as a significant factor in the adoption of technologies requiring 
greater managerial skills leading us to expect a positive effect of education on the adoption of 
RMPs that could require hiring labor such as with labor intensive technologies. Additionally, 
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studies show higher education leads to the adoption of multiple agricultural technologies 
(Chaves & Riley, 2001; Lohr & Park, 2002). 
Studies have found household size contributes to technology adoption. De Souza 
Filho and others (1999) found households with a larger number of family members to work 
on the farm were more likely to adopt sustainable agricultural technologies. However, 
Mauceri et al (2005) found larger households adopt less integrated pest management 
strategies. Due to these results, we have included whether the farmer has a spouse, who could 
potentially contribute to farm labor. 
In addition to household size, farm size impacts a farmer’s decision to adopt certain 
technologies. Most research has shown that adoption increases as farm size increases 
(Fernandez-Cornejo et al (2001); Fernandez-Cornejo & McBride (2002); Isgin et al (2008); 
Sharma et al (2009)). Adopting new technologies can cause high fixed costs, which is easier 
for larger farms to absorb than smaller farms. As previously stated in the conceptual 
framework and supported by previous research, we expect larger farms to adopt more RMPs.  
Including the percent of household income that is generated from the farm operation is a 
proxy for the farmer’s opportunity cost. If a majority of the income comes from off-farm 
work, the farmer does not have much time to contribute to the farm operations and therefore 
may be less likely to adopt time-intensive RMPs. However, off farm income could relax a 
credit constraint. 
Regression Results 
PCA RMP groupings 
The results from estimating the coefficients of the empirical model explaining a 
farmer’s probability of adopting four different RMP groups, determined using PCA, are 
reported in Table 4.5. As a farmer’s age increases, he/she is significantly less likely to use 
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labor and capital intensive RMPs. Younger farmers could be more able-bodied making labor 
intensive (hand-weeding) RMPs a more reasonable option for them compared to older 
farmers. While, a farmer with more years of formal education is significantly more likely to 
use chemical intensive and biological intensive RMPs. 
 The presence of a spouse increases the likelihood a farmer will use chemical intensive 
RMPs but is not statistically significant for the use of other RMPs. Therefore, our results do 
not support the previous findings in literature that households with more family farm labor 
adopt more technologies. Additionally, if the farmer is male he is more likely to use chemical 
intensive and biological intensive RMPs than a female farmer. 
An increase in acres farmed increases the probability the farmer is to use chemical 
intensive RMPs.  However, as farms continue to increase in size, the marginal effect of size 
becomes negative, due to the negative coefficient on the quadratic farm size variable. 
Specifically, a farmer is more likely to use chemical intensive RMPs until he/she is farming 
256 acres, after which he/she is significantly less likely to use chemical intensive RMPs. 
Acres farmed is an insignificant predictor of using biological intensive RMPs, but the 
quadratic term is negative and significant. Specifically, once a farmer is farming 181 acres, 
he/she is significantly less likely to use biological intensive RMPs. Additionally, as the 
percent of household income from the farm operation increases, the farmer is significantly 
more likely to use chemical intensive RMPs.  
All of the correlation coefficients from the multivariate probit model are positive and 
significant but the correlation between chemical and labor-intensive technologies and labor 
and capital-intensive technologies are insignificant. Based on this model, individual RMP 
groups are more likely to be used together than not used together. 
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Weed Science RMP groupings 
Table 4.7 contains the results from estimating the coefficients of the multivariate 
probit model, explaining a farmer’s probability of adopting three different RMP groups, 
based on a weed scientists approach. These results are not much different from the results 
reported above from the first RMP grouping. 
As a farmer’s age increases, he/she is significantly less likely to use cultural or 
mechanical based RMPs. Similar to the results above, younger farmers may be more able-
bodied making labor (and time) intensive RMPs a more reasonable option compared to older 
farmers. More years of formal education significantly increases the probability a farmer will 
use cultural or chemical based RMPs. The presence of a spouse significantly increases the 
probability that a farmer will use chemical intensive RMPs but does not significantly impact 
the probability of use of cultural or mechanical RMP groups.  Additionally, if the farmer is a 
male, he is significantly more likely to use chemical intensive RMPs than a female farmer. 
An increase in acres farmed significantly increases the probability a farmer will use 
chemical intensive RMPs until a farm operation reaches 272 acres, after which the 
probability of using chemical intensive RMPs significantly decrease. Also, as the percent of 
income from the farm operation increases, the farmer is significantly more likely to use 
chemical intensive RMPs.   
Complementarity 
In addition to evaluating farmers’ adoption of RMPs, we test the complementarity of 
the numerous potential RMP bundles using an analysis developed by Yu, et. al (2012). This 
analysis allows us to test if RMP bundles are used more or less frequently in our sample than 
if these bundles were chosen at random (assumption of independence). First, under the 
assumption of independent RMPs, we construct the expected probability that a given bundle 
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of RMPs will be chosen at random. Next, we compare the actual frequency farmers use a 
given bundle of RMPs to the predicted probability under the assumption of independence. If 
the bundle is selected significantly more frequent than under the hypothesis of independence, 
the RMPs within the bundle are mutually complementary. If the bundle is selected 
significantly less frequently than under the hypothesis of independence, the RMPs within the 
bundle can be viewed as substitutes (not used together frequently) (Yu, Hurley, Kliebenstein, 
& Orazem, 2012). 
 With 𝐽 RMPs that can be used alone or in combination, there are 2𝐽 potential bundles. 
Following Yu, et at. (2012), the probability 𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝐽, is adopted is defined as  
1 > 𝑝𝑗 > 0. Let 𝑍𝑗, (𝑗 = 1, 2, … 𝐽) be equal to 1 if the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ RMP is adopted and 0 otherwise, 
such that the set of RMP bundles is defined as 𝑌𝑟 = {𝑍1, 𝑍2, … , 𝑍𝑗}, where 𝑟 = 1, 2, … , 2
𝐽.  
The probability RMP bundle 𝑟 is adopted is defined as 1 > 𝑞𝑟 > 0, such that ∑ 𝑞𝑟
2𝐽
𝑟=1 = 1.  
Furthermore, let’s define the set of RMPs used in RMP bundle 𝑌𝑟 as  
Ω𝑟
𝐴 = {𝑗|𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝐽 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋𝑗 = 1} and the set of RMPs not used in the bundle is 
 Ω𝑟
𝑁 = {𝑗|𝑗 = 1, 2, … 𝐽 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑍𝑗 = 0}.  
The expected probability that RMP bundle 𝑟 is adopted is 
𝑞𝑟
0 = ∏ 𝑝𝑗
𝑗∈Ω𝑟
𝐴
∏ (1 − 𝑝𝑙)
𝑙∈Ω𝑟
𝑁
. (4.10) 
Using these estimated probabilities, we can assess whether technologies within bundle 𝑗 are 
independent, mutual complements, or substitutes:  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐻0: 𝑞𝑟 = 𝑞𝑟
0
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐻𝑐: 𝑞𝑟 > 𝑞𝑟
0
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐻𝑠: 𝑞𝑟 < 𝑞𝑟
0
 
In order to test these hypotheses, we need estimates of the sampling distribution.  Given a 
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random sample of 𝐹 farmers (our sample includes 726 farmers), denoted by 𝑖 = 1, 2, … 𝐹, let 
𝑍𝑗
𝑖 = 1 if farmer 𝑖 adopts RMP 𝑗 and 0 otherwise.  Similarly, let 𝑌𝑟
𝑖 = 1, if farmer 𝑖 adopts 
RMP bundle 𝑟 and 0 otherwise. 
 Under the hypothesis of independence, the likelihood function for 𝑝𝑗 is 
𝐿 = ∏ ∏ 𝑝𝑗
𝑍𝑗
𝑖
(1 − 𝑝𝑗)
1−𝑍𝑗
𝑖
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐹
𝑖=1
, 
(4.11) 
resulting in a log-likelihood function of 
ln 𝐿 = ∑ [(∑ 𝑍𝑗
𝑖
𝐹
𝑖=1
) 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑗) + (𝐹 − ∑ 𝑍𝑗
𝑖
𝐹
𝑖=1
) 𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝑝𝑗)]
𝐽
𝑗=1
. 
(4.12) 
Maximizing the log-likelihood function with respect to 𝑝𝑗, yields 
?̂?𝑗 =
∑ 𝑍𝑗
𝑖𝐹
𝑖=1
𝐹
  
(4.13) 
for 𝑗 = 1, 2, … 𝐽. Next, the probability of adopting a given RMP 𝑗 can be calculated by the 
frequency of its occurrence in the random sample under independence, 
?̂?𝑟
0 = ∏ ?̂?𝑗
𝑗∈Ω𝑟
𝐴
∏(1 − ?̂?𝑙)
𝑙∈Ω𝑟
𝐴
. (4.14) 
Using the sampling data to estimate the probability that RMP bundle 𝑟 is adopted, the log-
likelihood function is 
ln 𝐿 = ∑ ln(𝑞𝑟)
2𝐽−1
𝑟
∑ 𝑌𝑟
𝑖
𝐹
𝑖=1
+ 𝑙𝑛 (1 − ∑ 𝑞𝑟
2𝐽−1
𝑟=1
) ∑ 𝑌2𝐽
𝑖
𝐹
𝑖=1
. 
(4.15) 
Maximum likelihood estimation of the equation above yields the estimates 
?̂?𝑟 =
∑ 𝑌𝑟
𝑖𝐹
𝑖=1
𝐹
 
(4.16) 
for 𝑟 = 1, 2, … 2𝐽 − 1 and  
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?̂?2𝐽 = 1 − ∑ ?̂?𝑟
2𝐽−1
𝑟=1
. 
(4.17) 
To test the hypotheses listed above, sample variances are calculated using percentile 
bootstrapping.  We draw 5,000 replacement samples from the data.  For each of these 
samples ?̂?𝑟 and ?̂?𝑟
0 are calculated as well as the adoption rate differences (?̂?𝑟 − ?̂?𝑟
0). The 
differences are ordered from smallest to largest and the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles are 
located, which is the confidence interval at the 95% significance level.  If zero lies within the 
confidence interval, the null hypothesis of independence cannot be rejected.  If the lower 
bound of the confidence interval is positive, independence and substitutability can be 
rejected, but complementarity cannot be rejected.  If the upper bound of the confidence 
interval is positive, independence and complementarity can be rejected, while substitutability 
cannot be rejected. 
Complementarity Results 
PCA RMP groupings 
Our results show that the RMPs are mutual complements (bundle used more often 
than under independence) and are more likely to be complementary when no RMP is used or 
all four RMPs are used. This supports our hypothesis that farmers use an RMP until the 
marginal cost of increasing the intensity of the first RMP is greater than the marginal cost of 
introducing a second RMP. Farmers then add this second RMP into their resistant 
management plan. This continues until the farmer is using all the potential RMPs. 
 We also find chemical intensive and labor intensive RMPs are less likely to be used 
together than under independence. Similarly, using capital intensive and biological intensive 
RMPs jointly and using chemical intensive, labor intensive, and capital intensive RMPs  
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jointly is less likely than under the assumption of independence. These results further support 
our insignificant correlation coefficients from the multivariate probit model. 
Weed Science RMP groupings 
Similar to the results above, all three RMPs are mutual complements. The use of all 
three RMP groups simultaneously occurs in our sample more often than would be expected 
under independence. Additionally, using two of the RMP groups together, without the third, 
occurs less often than under the assumption of independence. Farmers are no longer able to 
use just one or even two RMP groups and have resorted to using a combination of all three 
groups. As chemicals are becoming a less effective measure of pest control, farmers are 
adopting cultural and mechanical RMPs to control pests on their fields. 
Conclusion 
This study shows that age, education and gender significantly impact the probability a 
farmer will adopt certain RMP groups. Specifically, younger farmers are more likely to adopt 
labor, mechanical and capital intensive RMPs. While male farmers or farmers with more 
years of formal education are more likely to adopt chemical and cultural intensive RMPs. 
Additionally, the use of chemical intensive RMPs are positively and significantly correlated 
with the use of capital intensive and cultural intensive RMPs. The use of labor intensive and 
capital intensive RMPs are positively and significantly correlated with the use of biological 
intensive RMPs. 
Further, the complementarity of RMP bundles is evaluated. With the four PCA based 
groupings of RMPs, there are 16 potential RMP bundles and with the three weed science 
based groupings of RMPs, there are 8 potential bundles. Farmers use all RMP groups, in both 
cases, simultaneously more often than is predicted under independence. Looking at the data  
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further, 39% of the farmers in the sample use a combination of all four PCA RMP groups and 
70% of the farmers use a combination of all three weed science based RMP groups. 
This supports the hypothesis that due to rising marginal cost of pesticide use intensity, 
the RMP is adopted up to some level after which a second RMP is adopted. This continues 
until the farmer is using a combination of all RMP groups. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 4.1 The Number of Glyphosate Resistant Weed Species in the US 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Illustration of Technology Choices as a Function of Desired Output 
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Table 4.1 Herbicide Resistance Management Practices 
RMP Percent of farmers that use the RMP 
Rotation of crops 92.70 
Inclusion of forage in the crop rotation  23.42 
Use of cover crops 15.70 
Use of crop cultivars that are resistant to 
herbicides other than glyphosate 
25.76 
Multiple herbicide application timings 80.03 
Multiple modes of herbicide action used 
each season 
69.56 
Multiple modes of herbicide action used in 
each herbicide application 
57.16 
Tillage 72.45 
Mechanical weed control (cultivation) 23.83 
Hand-weeding 28.93 
Higher planting rates 47.66 
 
 
Table 4.2 Resistance Management Practice Groupings using PCA 
RMP Percent of farmers that use the RMP 
bundles* 
Chemical intensive only 0.69 
Labor intensive (forage/cover 
crops/mechanical/hand-weed) only 
0.28 
Capital intensive (tillage/higher planting rates) 
only 
0.28 
Biological intensive (rotate crops/use cultivars) 
only 
1.4 
Chemical and labor intensive 0.14 
Chemical and capital intensive 1.8 
Chemical and biological intensive 6.1 
Labor and capital intensive 0.55 
Labor and biological intensive 1.4 
Capital and biological intensive 2.3 
Chemical, labor, and capital intensive 1.4 
Chemical, labor, and biological intensive 6.9 
Chemical, capital, and biological intensive 31.3 
Labor, capital, and biological intensive 5.1 
Chemical, labor, capital, and biological 
intensive (all four RMPs) 
39.4 
*There are 8 of 726 (or 1.1 percent) farmers who report not using any RMPs 
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Table 4.3 Resistance Management Practice Groupings using Weed Science 
Approach 
RMP Pct. of farmers that use the RMP 
group* 
Cultural intensive (rotation, forage, cover crops, 
and higher planting rates) only 
2.3 
Chemical intensive only 0.69 
Mechanical intensive (tillage, cultivation, hand-
weeding) only 
0.28 
Cultural and chemical intensive 16.7 
Cultural and mechanical intensive 7.0 
Chemical and mechanical intensive 2.1 
Cultural, chemical, and mechanical intensive 69.8 
*There are 8 of 726 (or 1.1 percent) farmers who report not using any RMPs 
 
Table 4.4 Sample Means 
Variables Mean 
Age 63.71 
Years of education 14.12 
Spouse (=1 if yes) 0.76 
Male (=1 if yes) 0.97 
Total acres farmed (hundreds) 0.5079 
Percent of Income from Farm Operation 0.589 
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Table 4.5 Multivariate Probit: Probability of adopting 𝑹𝑴𝑷𝒋 (PCA) 
Technology Type by Input Intensity 
 Chemical Labor Capital Biological 
Age 0.002 -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.011 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
Years of Education 0.046* 0.019 -0.027 0.080** 
 (0.027) (0.020) (0.023) (0.033) 
Spouse (=1 if yes) 0.335** 0.132 0.169 -0.147 
 (0.140) (0.112) (0.129) (0.184) 
Male (=1 if yes) 0.860*** -0.027 0.275 0.585* 
 (0.295) (0.278) (0.292) (0.351) 
Total Acres Farmed 0.893*** 0.160 -0.215 0.428 
 (0.258) (0.172) (0.269) (0.265) 
Total Acres Farmed Squared -0.163*** -0.020 0.092 -0.118** 
 (0.052) (0.046) (0.105) (0.052) 
Percent of Income from 
Farm Operation 
0.684*** -0.265 0.065 0.206 
(0.253) (0.199) (0.236) (0.305) 
Constant -1.317* 1.085* 2.309*** 0.441 
 (0.713) (0.555) (0.642) (0.868) 
Correlation Coefficients     
Chemical 1    
Labor 0.040 1   
Capital 0.259*** 0.061 1  
Biological 0.303*** 0.171**    0.295*** 1 
* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level 
 
Table 4.6 RMP Complementarity Test Results (PCA) 
Complement bundles No RMP  
All 4 RMPs  
Substitute bundles Chemical & Labor 
Capital & Biological 
Chemical & Labor & Capital 
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Table 4.7 Multivariate Probit: Probability of Adopting 𝑹𝑴𝑷𝒋 (Weed Sci.) 
Technology Type by Input Intensity 
 Cultural Chemical Mechanical 
Age -0.018* -0.002 -0.028*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
Years of Education 0.092** 0.059** -0.021 
 (0.040) (0.028) (0.022) 
Spouse (=1 if yes) 0.112 0.340** 0.087 
 (0.200) (0.144) (0.127) 
Male (=1 if yes) -0.008 0.822*** 0.386 
 (0.521) (0.301) (0.283) 
Total Acres Farmed 0.061 0.937*** -0.055 
 (0.339) (0.270) (0.260) 
Total Acres Farmed Squared -0.029 -0.172*** 0.049 
 (0.088) (0.053) (0.102) 
Percent of Income from 
Farm Operation 
0.589 0.540** -0.197 
(0.360) (0.260) (0.229) 
Constant 1.252 -1.085 2.625*** 
 (1.078) (0.740) (0.628) 
Correlation Coefficients    
Cultural 1   
Chemical 0.205* 1  
Mechanical 0.250*** 0.182** 1 
* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level 
 
Table 4.8 RMP Complementarity Test Results (Weed Sci.) 
Complement bundles No RMP  
All 3 RMPs  
Substitute bundles Cultural & Chemical 
Cultural & Mechanical 
Chemical & Mechanical 
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Appendix. Principal Component Analysis 
Principal component analysis (PCA) allows us the observe patterns of similarity of 
the resistance management practice variables. Based on the results from the PCA, we 
combine resistance management practices into groups. The eigenvalues from PCA and Scree 
plot are displayed in the tables and figure below.  
According to Kaiser’s rule (Kaiser, 1961), an eigenvalue greater than 1 indicates the 
principal components account for more variance than is accounted by one of original 
variables. Additionally, this is a good cut-off rule for determining the number of principal 
components to retain. Applying the rule to our results leads us to believe we have 4 RMP 
groupings. However, cutting off at 4 PCs only explains 54% of the variation in our data. 
Jolliffe (2002) argues, a sensible cut-off is a total variation of 70% to 90%. The author does 
go on to explain the range can be lower or higher depending on the details for the data set 
(Jolliffe, 2002). 
The Scree plot, which is a plot of the eigenvalues ordered from largest to smallest, 
provides another useful mechanism to aid in our cut-off decision. The number of PCs to 
retain (𝑘) is determined by examining the slope of the lines to the left of the selected PC and 
to the right. Ideally, the slope of the lines to the left of 𝑘 are steep and to the right of 𝑘 are not 
steep. Using our Scree plot, we decided the optimal number of RMP groupings is 4. The 
slope of the line to the left of 4 is relatively steep and the slope to the right of 4 starts to 
flatten out. 
Therefore, based on the three rules mentioned about it was determined to use 4 RMP 
groupings. To determine which RMPs to group together, the eigenvectors associated with the 
first four components (Table A.2) and the most significantly correlated variables within a 
given component (Tables A.3 – A.7). 
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The first principal component is highly correlated with using multiple herbicide 
timings, multiple modes of herbicide action used each season, and multiple modes of action 
used in each herbicide application, which is our first RMP group (chemical intensive RMPs). 
From the correlations in the second principal component, our second RMP group consists of 
inclusion of forage in the crop rotation, cover crops, mechanical weed control, and hand-
weeding (labor intensive RMPs). Likewise, our third RMP group is tillage and higher 
planting rates (capital intensive RMPs). Finally, our fourth RMP group is rotation of crops 
and use of crop cultivars that are resistant to herbicides other than glyphosate (biological 
intensive RMPs). 
 
Table A9 Principal Component Analysis Results 
 
Eigenvalue 
Variance 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Variance 
Percent 
Comp 1 2.0157 18.32 18.32 
Comp 2 1.6731 15.21 33.53 
Comp 3 1.2016 10.92 44.46 
Comp 4 1.0707 9.73 54.19 
Comp 5 0.9468 8.61 62.80 
Comp 6 0.9254 8.41 71.21 
Comp 7 0.8045 7.31 78.53 
Comp 8 0.7103 6.46 84.98 
Comp 9 0.6566 5.97 90.95 
Comp 10 0.5873 5.34 96.29 
Comp 11 0.4080 3.71 100 
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Table A10 Eigenvectors for the first four components of PCA 
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 
Rotate crops 0.1815 0.1308 0.2302 0.4103 
Include forage in rotation -0.0493 0.5257 0.3381 0.1235 
Cover crops -0.0327 0.4637 0.4514 -0.0765 
Use of cultivars other than glyphosate resistant 0.1888 0.0716 0.3112 0.1114 
Multiple herbicide applications 0.4819 -0.1668 0.0158 -0.0566 
Multiple MOA used each season 0.5775 -0.14 0.0756 -0.1388 
Multiple MOA used each application 0.5016 -0.0638 0.1964 -0.0486 
Tillage 0.1643 0.284 -0.5001 0.3062 
Mechanical weed control 0.1463 0.468 -0.3401 -0.2448 
Hand weed 0.1946 0.3596 -0.2641 -0.4087 
Higher planting rates 0.1559 0.0766 -0.2282 0.6727 
 
 
Table A11 Correlation coefficients 
between variables and PC1 
Variables Correlation 
Multiple MOA used each 
season 
0.8199 
Multiple MOA used each 
application 
0.7121 
Multiple herbicide 
applications 
0.6842 
Hand-weeding 0.2762 
Use of cultivars other than 
glyphosate resistant 
0.2680 
Rotation of crops 0.2576 
Tillage 0.2333 
Higher planting rates 0.2214 
Mechanical weed control 0.2078 
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Table A12 Correlation coefficients 
between variables and PC2 
Variables Correlation 
Inclusion of forage in 
rotation 
0.6800 
Mechanical weed control 0.6053 
Cover crops 0.5998 
Hand-weeding  0.4652 
Tillage  0.3674 
Rotation of crops  0.1692 
Higher planting rates  0.0991 
Use of cultivars other than 
glyphosate resistant  
0.0926 
Multiple MOA used each 
application 
-0.0826 
Multiple MOA used each 
season 
-0.1811 
Multiple herbicide 
applications 
-0.2158 
 
Table A13 Correlation coefficients 
between variables and PC3 
Variables Correlation 
Cover crops 0.4948 
Inclusion of forage in 
rotation 
0.3706 
Use of cultivars other than 
glyphosate resistant 
0.3411 
Rotation of crops 0.2524 
Multiple MOA used each 
application 
0.2153 
Multiple MOA used each 
season 
0.0829 
Higher planting rates  -0.2502 
Hand-weeding  -0.2895 
Mechanical weed control -0.3728 
Tillage  -0.5482 
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Table A14 Correlation coefficients 
between variables and PC4 
Variables Correlation 
Higher planting rates 0.6961 
Rotation of crops 0.4246 
Tillage  0.3169 
Inclusion of forage in 
rotation 
0.1278 
Use of cultivars other than 
glyphosate resistant 
0.1153 
Cover crops -0.0792 
multiple MOA used each 
season 
-0.1436 
Mechanical weed control -0.2533 
Hand-weeding  -0.4230 
 
 
 
Figure A3 Scree Plot 
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CHAPTER 5.    CONCLUSION 
This dissertation explores two distinct but related areas: how injected information 
affects consumer’s demand for genetically engineered food products, and how farm and 
farmer attributes affect adoption of resistance management practices to cope with herbicide 
resistance in genetically engineered crop varieties. Genetic engineering has produced crops 
that improve food safety and food security for our growing population. Innate Potatoes have 
been genetically engineered to produce low levels of acrylamide, which is a known cancer-
causing agent in humans. Additionally, it has low browning and low bruising properties, 
which reduces food waste. Consumer acceptance of these second-generation genetically 
engineered potatoes can be very beneficial to society.  
The first two essays support previous research that consumers are accepting of 
genetically engineered (GE) products if viewed as benefiting the public. When consumers 
received positive information about genetic engineering and information on the benefit of 
low-acrylamide products, consumers were willing to pay significantly more for GE products 
after reading this information. Further, consumers had the highest willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
for GE potato products when these two types of information were paired. The effect on WTP 
was not as strong when positive GE information and informative acrylamide information was 
separated. However, information did not significantly impact a consumer’s WTP for 
conventional potato products, even after being informed of the cancer-causing potential of 
acrylamide.  Therefore, we see consumers are willing to pay more for “safer” or less risky 
food products but not willing to pay less for these riskier, potentially cancer-causing, 
conventional products.  
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Genetic engineering has also produced herbicide tolerant (HT) crops, which allow 
herbicides to be used on crops with minimal crop damage. The most widespread HT crops 
are glyphosate tolerant. Glyphosate is a broad-spectrum and low toxicity herbicide. The 
introduction of glyphosate tolerant crops allowed farmers to use glyphosate in place of highly 
toxic alternative chemicals. However, this led to the overuse of glyphosate and rapid rise of 
weeds resistant to glyphosate. With glyphosate becoming ineffective on these resistant weed 
species, farmers must seek other resistance management practices (RMPs), or methods of 
weed control. 
In the third essay, I find age, gender, and education significantly affect a farmer’s use 
of certain RMP groups. Specifically, younger farmers are more likely to use cultural 
intensive and mechanical intensive RMPs, where mechanical also includes labor intensive 
(hand-weeding) practices. Farmers with more years of formal education and male farmers are 
more likely to use chemical and cultural RMPs. Additionally, using a test of complementarity 
among RMP bundles, we find all RMP groups are more likely to be used simultaneously than 
individually. Farmers first adopt the RMP with the lowest marginal cost and increase 
intensity of use until the marginal cost of increasing intensity of use is greater than the 
marginal cost of adopting another RMP.  This continues until the farmer has adopted all 
potential RMP groups, which is evident in our results. 
Widespread acceptance of genetically engineered crops can be valuable to society. 
GE food products offer increased food safety and security. Consumer acceptance of these 
food products is significantly impacted by the type of information they receive. But 
unexpected consequences from the GE crop adoption can occur, such as the rapid increase of 
weeds resistant to herbicides which complement the GE crops. These consequences have led 
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to the adoption of costly alternative weed control practices. Additional insights into the 
diffusion of information on GE crops and potential unintended consequences of adoption will 
support the acceptance of our transforming agricultural practice. 
